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One needs but the briefest of introductions to the Marshall Plan to
quickly realize that it ranks with the most consequential instruments of its
time. That the situation in western Europe in the dark days which followed
World War II was grim, is well documented; that the assistance tendered by
the United States to the countries of western Europe was generous, is well
acknowledged; and that western Europe by the mid 1950' s had, by and large,
more than regained its economic health, is undeniable.
It is in trying to establish a cause and effect relationship be-
tween these facts that the student runs into trouble. It is tempting to
assign the label of "cause-effect" to the relationship of assistance-recov-
ery; to arbitrarily do so, however, is to lose objectivity.
Few would dispute that the great and steady strides by western
Europe were made possible by the laying of a tremendous foundation in the
early post-war years. The United States participated in the structuring
of this foundation but the role played by the recipients of the assistance
can not be overstated. It is the relative extent to which the United States
and western Europe participated in the creation of this all-important
foundation which remains the salient question. In short, while the facts
are clear, their relationships are less so.
1

Statement of Research Question
Drawn by the desire to establish a cause-effect relationship be-
tween the implementation of the Marshall Plan on the one hand, and the
recovery of western Europe on the other, we are inexorably led to ask:
How did the Marshall Plan contribute to the economic recovery of western
Europe? Put somewhat more dramatically and perhaps emotionally, I must
admit, the question might be rephrased: Would there have been economic
chaos in western Europe if the United States had not, when it did, stepped
in with the economic assistance which came to be known as the Marshall
Plan?
To the end of answering the foregoing primary question I feel it is
necessary to examine several subsidiary points and to ask certain questions
about them. First of all, since we are trying to determine if a cause-
effect relationship exists it is absolutely essential that we analyze the
economic posture of western Europe during the days following World War II.
Specifically, what were the economic conditions in western Europe at the
close of World War II? Some felt that the situation, while poor, was cer-
tainly not critical. Others, among them Secretary of State George C.
Marshall, felt that:
We were faced with immediate issues which vitally concerned the
impoverished and suffering people of Europe who are crying for help,
for coal, for food, and for most of the necessities of life.
Next, it is of signal importance that we ask: How did the Marshall
Plan unfold and function to accomplish its mission? An analysis of the
birth, first steps and maturity of the Marshall Plan will be of great
assistance in examining its impact on western Europe.
1George C. Marshall, Department of State Bulletin , Vol. XVI, May
11,1947 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 920.

It is imperative that we re-examine the western European countries
as of June 30, 1952 (officially the last day of the Marshall Plan) to
determine what definitive progress was made in the areas of industrial and
agricultural production. More specifically, did economic activity regain
its pre-war levels or better? If a cause-effect relationship is to emerge
and withstand the scrutiny of examination then we must look at the "before"
and "after" as a prerequisite to further analysis. Included in the "after"
evaluation is a look at the subject of European economic cooperation.
Namely, what seeds of economic cooperation were planted among the partici-
pating countries by the implementation of the Marshall Plan? Were the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation and other such vehicles tem-
porary mechanisms established to solve transient problems or did th^y
represent the genesis of true economic cooperation?
The answers to these subsidiary questions will make possible an
intelligent response to the broader primary question.
Scope of Study
The Marshall Plan was not purely an "economic animal." It also had
its humanitarian aspects, its political facets, its diplomatic overtones,
and even its military implications—all in addition to the more obvious
mainstream of economic purpose. The scope of this paper is limited to the
economic ramifications of the Marshall Plan. This is not to say that the
other factors were not of great importance. They were, and at key times in
the years since World War II may have had a greater bearing on the outcome
of history than the purely economic factors. However, the economic factors
have always been and will continue to be the foundation upon which the other
aspects necessarily rest. Other factors can be and are of significance to
be sure, but if they are to be of any lasting importance they must be

supported by economic reality. By looking at the economic aspects of the
Marshall Plan, in other words, we see not only the industrial and agricul-
tural posture of western Europe, but the backdrop of the entire drama of
the humanitarian, political, diplomatic and military worlds as well.
Purpose of Study
The purpose of this study is twofold: First, from a pragmatic
point of view, an analysis of the Marshall Plan serves to provide a valu-
able perspective into such on-going programs as the Alliance for Progress.
While the differences between the two are admittedly numerous and obvious,
the similarities are nonetheless many and certainly worthy of examination.
A score of years since the end of the Marshall Plan provides a comfortable
vantage point from which to peruse underlying concepts. In turn, these
models may be of considerable assistance in analyzing the implementation
of today's foreign aid program.
Secondly, taken from a more academic point of view, a study of the
Marshall Plan gives considerable food for thought for concepts of a highly
stimulating nature. The idea, for example, that man makes his great strides
forward by "social inventions" * prompts one to place the Marshall Plan on
the list with the most noble of man's accomplishments. Yet academic
objectivity and skepticism demand that we ask: Were the motives of the
United States truly altruistic or were they self-serving? Academic inquis-
itiveness further prompts the student to ask: Would there be a western
Europe as we know it today if the Marshall Plan had not been implemented?
Would western Europe, instead of Korea, have been the scene of Communism's
^Harvey S. Perloff, Alliance for Progress: A Social Invention in
the Making (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), p. xiii.

attack of June 25, 1950, if economic life had not been breathed into the
bodies of the respective countries? While admittedly "what if" in nature,
these questions nonetheless probe at the very heart of the Marshall Plan
and warrant serious reflection.
Methodology
Standard research methods were employed. The libraries of the
Department of State and of the Agency for International Development were
valuable sources of information. Interviews with A.I.D. personnel who had
been with the program since its inception, proved to be of great assistance
not only to get a flavor for the atmosphere within the agency in its early
years (then known as the Economic Cooperation Administration) but also to
serve as a sounding board for primary and secondary research questions.
The gentlemen interviewed were considerate, helpful and above all enthusi-
astic in reminiscing about events which had taken place over 20 years
before.
In response to my letter, Mr. Paul G. Hoffman (now over 80 years
old and considered by many to be one of the most dedicated public servants
of this century) first administrator of the Economic Cooperation Adminis-
tration, wrote back with a great deal of invaluable first-hand information--
the type impossible to find in the stacks of even the best library. His
encouragement was heartening to say the least.
Organization of Study
The study and thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter II, the
economic situation which existed in the aftermath of World War II is de-
scribed. Levels of industrial and agricultural production as well as the

general health and pulse of the aggregate economy of western Europe are
stressed.
In Chapter III, the sentiment and rhetoric which surrounded the
unfolding of the European Recovery Program are dealt with.
In Chapter IV, is described the machinery which was set up to admin-
ister the Marshall Plan, that is the Economic Cooperation Administration,
and how it was established. Chapter IV deals with the 51-month period
which marked the life of the Marshall Plan. Somewhat arbitrarily this
section of the chapter is divided into an analysis of major developments
by fiscal year. As explained in more detail in that particular chapter,
the breakdown by fiscal years is not so much discretionary as useful. Pro-
gram emphasis, not to mention funding levels, varied by fiscal year and for
this reason alone it serves as a handy division. This chapter strives to
provide a year-by-year analysis of the recovery effort.
Chapter V deals with an assessment and evaluation of the Marshall
Plan taken as a whole, looking at the progress made, the crisis averted,
the problems conquered and the footholds towards permanent cooperation
secured.
Finally, Chapter VI serves as the Summary and Conclusion.

CHAPTER II
THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR II
Introduction
The economic conditions of western Europe in the day? following
World War II might best be described by paraphrasing the opening lines from
Charles Dickens' A Tale of Two Cities; "It was the best of times, it was
the worst of times." Underlying the sheer joy which marked the end of the
war and beneath the understandably optimistic hopes for peace, there was,
It is sad to say, a much harsher reality to face.
The Best and Worst of Times
May is a beautiful month in Europe and to millions of war-wracked
Europeans, none could compare with the May of 1945. As the bells rang
in another peace, eyes went up to a cloudless sky, fearlessly and un-
searchingly for the first time in almost six years. In countless cities,
trucks unloaded their often pathetic freight of pale and emaciated men
returning to the arms of their families after years of involuntary
servitude or worse. Every manner of rolling stock was winding through
the countryside, bedecked with flags and flowers, crowded with returning
internees. The ruins were still there, communications and industry
still paralyzed, but even in defeated Germany the bottom had been
reached. The terrifying worst was over; henceforth there was only one
way for Europe to travel—upward. *
In Sir Winston Churchill's own words:
The Hitler Peril, with its ordeals and privations, seemed to most of
them _/the cheering crowds in London/ to have vanished in a blaze of
glory. The tremendous foe they had fought for more than five years had
Hans A. Schmitt, The Path to European Union (Baton Rouge
Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), p. 17.
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surrendered unconditionally. All that remained for the three victorious
Powers was to make a just and durable peace, guarded by a World Instru-
ment, to bring the soldiers home to their longing loved ones, and to
enter upon a Golden Age of prosperity and progress.^-
The misconception that everything would be all right in no time at
all was, initially at least, quite widespread. It did not take long, how-
ever, for harsh reality to be asserted. We see this metamorphosis of thought
so well described by Will Clayton, former Under Secretary of State:
At first the recovery went even faster than after World War I. But then
things started going wrong. A severe winter was followed by floods and
1947 it was plainly evident that . . . Europe was too depleted to provide
the capital resources for the long-range reconstruction.
^
Several authors have used an analogy which, although not fully accu-
rate, is certainly highly descriptive. They have likened western Europe to
a seriously injured man, who after the accident runs about helping here and
there and then finally realizes that he too is seriously hurt and falls into
shock. Harry B. Price in an interview with former Secretary of State Dean
Acheson quoted the Secretary as saying:
The whole matter begins with the misconception which everybody had
regarding the nature and depth of the problem after the Second World
War. No one had a picture of the completeness of the destruction that
had occurred .... We had operated on a theory of dealing with hunger,
disease, and unrest until one or two good crops could come in. But the
problems were more far-reaching, and it grew upon us towards the end of
1946 that we were heading for very bad troubles.
A Crushed Economic Mechanism
The war had very literally almost completely crushed the economic
Winston Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , Vol. VI (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1953) p. 569.
o
Schmitt, The Path to European Union, p. 18.
3
Harry B. Price, The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning (Ithica, New York:
Cornell University Press, 1955), p. 9.

mechanism by which the western European countries made their livings indi-
vidually and collectively. That this finally became plainly evident to our
government is to be seen in these words of the Secretary of State:
It was the war which destroyed coal mines and deprived the workshop of
sufficient mechanical energy. It was the war which destroyed steel
mills and thus cut down the workshop's material for fabrication. It
was the war which destroyed transportation lines and equipment and thus
made the ability to move goods and people inadequate. It was the war
which destroyed merchant fleets and thus cut off accustomed income from
carrying the world's goods. It was the war which destroyed or caused
the loss of so much of foreign investment and income which it has pro-
duced. It was the war which bled inventories and working capital out
of existence. It was the war which shattered business relationships
and markets and the sources of raw materials. The war disrupted the
flow of vital raw materials from Southeast Asia, thereby breaking the
pattern of multilateral trade which formerly provided, directly or in-
directly, large dollar earnings for western Europe .... This is the
essence of the economic problem of Europe.
Expressed quantitatively the picture took on added meaning. What
the words "crushed" and "destroyed" might not have conveyed, the following
statistics did so, rudely:
Industrial production in Belgium, France, and The Netherlands was
reduced to between 30 and 40 percent of pre-war, in Italy to 20 percent.
Production of bread grains fell to two-thirds of pre-war.
The table on the following page gives an excellent idea of how the
level of production of selected industrial and agricultural commodities
compared in the first quarter of calendar year 1948 to the levels of produc-
tion which had existed in 1938. All of the figures are in relation to an
index in which 1938 production has been set equal to 100. It is readily
apparent that with the single exception of electric power (which had, by
early 1948, already rebounded to above pre-war levels) the other commodities
were significantly below their 1938 levels.
George C. Marshall, Assistance to European Economic Recovery
,
Department of State Publication #3022 (Washington, D.C.: Government Print-
ing Office, 1948), pp. 2-3.
o
Robert C. Hartnett, and Tibor Payzs, The Marshall Plan: America's
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Of all the materials shortages by far the most serious is coal. There
is no country in western Europe where the coal supply does not, in
some measure, limit industrial output. In France, Italy and the Low
Countries it is the controlling bottleneck .... Europe's requirements
could be met from the Ruhr.
. . .
however, labor is scarce, miner's
rations in the past have been inadequate and their families ill-fed, re-
cruiting is handicapped by the shortage of housing and the appalling
condition of the Ruhr cities. Absentee rates are as high as 30%, steel
and machinery for rehabilitation and maintenance are scarce, and the
occupation management has been uncertain, ineffective, and on the whole,
incompetent.
Summers goes on to mention that before the war, the primary sources
of coal had been (in addition to the Ruhr) Wales and German/Polish Silesia.
However because of decreased coal production coupled with higher consumption
within the United Kingdom, no British coal remained for export. The
Silesian production, although potentially the largest in all of Europe,
because of the separation of East and West which occurred after the war
2became very simply unavailable.
In more general and broad terms the representatives of the sixteen
western European countries, which were ultimately to join hands for purposes
of economic recovery, summed up the cause of their difficulties and their
major shortcomings as follows:
1. Physical devastation and disruption in western Europe and in the
principal food and timber producing zones of eastern Europe, togeth-
er with the dislocation of the European transit system have caused
a temporary paralysis of production in western Europe, including
Germany.
2. Prolonged interruption of international trade occurred simultaneously
with the loss of income from merchant fleets and foreign investment,
and led to the exhaustion or diminution of dollar funds in the six-
teen countries at a moment when many vital needs could be met only
from dollar sources.
3. Human strain and exhaustion resulted from six years of war and enemy
occupation.
4. Internal financial disequilibrium was the inevitable result of a
^Robert E. Summers, Economic Aid to Europe: The Marshall Plan (New







5. In Southeast Asia there was a shortage in the supply of food and
raw materials which were vital to the European economy both for
direct consumption and as earners of dollars.
6. There was an abnormal increase of population in certain areas re-
sulting from the wartime displacement of peoples.
Ideological Struggle
As if the foregoing economic problems were not enough it quickly
became apparent that western Europe would have to contend with yet another
"attack" because: "The near collapse of Europe has left weakness where
once there was strength and has created in effect a political and economic
vacuum." That this sentiment was shared by the top echelons of our admin-
istration was made quite clear when the President stated:
The economic plight in which Europe now finds itself has intensified a
political struggle between those who wish to remain free men living
under the rule of law and those who would use economic-distress as a
pretext for the establishment of a totalitarian state.
And so we see another dimension, one every bit as deep and critical
as the economic one, coming into focus. As the two relate one to the other,
Secretary of State Marshall said: "This problem _/the economic problem/
would exist even though it were not complicated by the ideological struggles
in Europe between those who want to live as free men and those small groups
who aspire to dominate by the method of police state. "^
That the end of World War II should have posed a relatively unique
LNew York Times
, September 24, 1947, p. 25.
2George C. Marshall, The Problems of European Revival and German
and Austrian Peace Settlements
, Department of State Publication ir2990
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 5.
3Harry S. Truman, A Program for United States Aid to European
Recovery
,
Department of State Publication #3022 (Washington, D. C.
:
Government Printing Office, no date), p. 10.
4
Marshall, Assistance to European Economic Recovery, p. 3.
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power situation in which for once, not one but two major powers were to
emerge victorious, was not so much unforseen as it was not recognized as
posing a problem. It was only when the initial post-war meetings and con-
ferences with the Russians produced little more than irritation and misunder-
standings that the concept of a "cold war" was recognized. The situation
was to prompt the truism that "although the war had ended, the peace had
not yet come."
"Far from cooperating, the Soviet Union and the Communist parties
have proclaimed their determined opposition to a plan for European economic
recovery." In hindsight we can see that the seeds of "dis-cooperation"
had been planted by the Soviet Union long before the need for anything
resembling the Marshall Plan was ever felt. In an observation all the more
remarkable because it was written in 1948 without the comfortable and clari-
fying buffer of time to provide perspective, Hartnett and Payzs quite
accurately tell us that Russia:
. . . violated the Yalta Agreement of February, 1945, almost before the
ink was dry by installing a Communist-dominated government in Poland . .
. . Then, towards the end of 1946, guerilla troops armed in Yugoslavia
and aided and abetted by Bulgaria and Albania, began to harass the
northern borders of Greece. 2
In summing up the progress (or perhaps it would be more accurate to
say lack of progress) made at the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign
Ministers (March 10-April 24, 1947), Secretary of State George C. Marshall
had already begun at this point to see the proverbial handwriting on the
wall when, upon his return from Moscow, he said:
In a statement such as this it is not practicable to discuss the numerous








suffice, I think, to call attention to the fundamental problems whose
solution would probably lead to the quick adjustment of many other
differences. *•
In that statement to the people of the United States the Secretary
of State went on to mention the key unresolved problems of the Moscow
Meeting. As concerns the limits of power to be imposed upon the new central
German government, the Russians took the position of the necessity and de-
sirableness of having a strong central government; the United States,
England and France, on the other hand were in favor of a less strong and
less centralized German government.
On the subject of the German economy, while the United States,
England and France wanted a German economy fully and completely integrated
with those of the other western European countries (as had been agreed to at
Potsdam), the Soviets did not want to cooperate in establishing any such
balanced and integrated German economy.
The subject of reparations brought only completely dichotomized
opinions. In short, the Russians demanded major reparations including not
only the removing of virtually all German production capability but indeed
a "claim" against future production. The United States, England and France,
while mindful that technically at least "to the victor belongs the spoils",
felt that if Germany was ever to play a constructive and viable role and
take its proper place in the western European community, that reparations
should be of a limited nature (One might almost be tempted to use the word
"token" although the final amount decided on was certainly more than "token")
Other major points of disagreement must be touched upon to get some
George C. Marshall, an address by the Secretary of State on April
28, 1947 upon his return from the Moscow Meeting of the Council of Foreign
Ministers (March 10-April 24, 1947), Department of State Publication #2822,
(Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 2.
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feel for both the depth and breadth of the gap which existed between East
and West. The subject of boundaries was one on which there was almost
total disagreement. Under the proposal set forth by the Soviets, part of
Germany would have been lost to Poland (which in turn had lost much of its
eastern real estate to the USSR) in a boundary shift westward.
The subject of a settlement treaty became another area in which the
United States, England, and France cound not come to agreement with the
Russians. The former countries felt that all of the states which had been
at war with Germany should have some voice in the final settlement; the
U.S.S.R., on the other hand, felt that the matter was one which concerned
only the "Big Four."
A final major point of disagreement concerned Austria. The Soviets
wanted full reparations from Austria as well as the ceding of Carenthia to
Yugoslavia. The United States, England and France, as might be expected,
were opposed to this position.
It is easy to see what prompted Secretary Marshall to conclude:
"Agreement was made impossible at Moscow . . ./because/. . . propaganda
appeals to passion and prejudice /by the Russians/ appeared to take the
place of appeals to reason and understanding."
The tone and dialogue of the Moscow meeting was to be repeated al-
most verbatim later that same year at the London Meeting of the Council of
Foreign Ministers (November 25-December 16, 1947). Upon his return and in
a speech to the American peoples on the progress made in London, the
Secretary of State had to report in his first sentence that:
The result of the recent meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in







good faith, the integrity and the purposes of the governments of the
Western powers, particularly the United States, necessarily added
greatly to the confusion.
1
and coming even more to the point: "It finally became clear that we could
2
make no progress at this time ... so I suggested that we adjourn."
Synopsis
Perhaps under different conditions the United States could have
afforded to play a waiting game, but such was not the situation which con-
fronted our country in 1947. As Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen, Counselor of the
Department of State told the national convention of the United States Junior
Chamber of Commerce:
People long tired, cold, hungry, and impoverished are not want to examine
critically the credentials of those promising them food, shelter and
clothes. And dictators, knowing that they intend to hold power if they
can get it, will play the right side or the left side and sometimes both
sides to get and keep power.
Put at its simplest, the time had come to act. The luxury of being
able to wait and remain inactive had come to an end. Upon his return from
the Moscow Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Secretary of
State (in an address already cited) after listing the innumerable difficul-
ties encountered in striving for cooperation with the U.S.S.R., in the
closing part of his speech said:
We cannot ignore the factor of time involved here. The recovery of
Europe has been far slower than had been expected. . . . The patient is
George C. Marshall, an address by the Secretary of State on Decem-
ber 19, 1947, upon his return from the London Meeting of the Foreign
Ministers (November 25-December 16, 1947), (Washington D.C. : Government





3Benjamin V. Cohen, American Traditions in Today's Foreign Policy
,
Department of State Bulletin XVI, No. 416 (Washington, D. C. : Government
Printing Office, 1947), p. 1230.
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sinking while the doctors deliberate. So I believe that action can not
await compromise through exhaustion. Whatever action is possible to
meet these pressing problems must be taken without delay. . . . The
state of the world today and the position of the United States make
mandatory, in my opinion, a unity of action on the part of the American
people.
1
The stage had been set for the creation of a "social invention."
As Harvey S. Perloff was to later describe the Marshall Plan: "Normally we
^/mankind/ make our great moves forward through social inventions. The
2Marshall Plan was such an invention."
No other single quote better summarizes the situation as it existed
in late 1947 than the one which follows. No words better describe the back-
ground for what was to become one of our country's most significant foreign
policy decisions in its entire history, than these words by Secretary of
State George C. Marshall:
Left to their _/the western European countries/ own resources there will
be, I believe, no escape from economic distress so intense, social dis-
contents so violent, political confusion so widespread, and hopes for
the future so shattered that the historical base of western civilization,
of which we are by belief and inheritance an integral part, will take
on a new form in the image of the tyranny that we fought to destroy in
Germany. The vacuum which the war created in western Europe will be
filled by the forces of which war was made. . . . The foundation of
political vitality is economic recovery.-^
That our unwillingness to help western Europe would create such a
vacuum with its attendant ramifications was axiomatic to the President and
to the Secretary of State (as well as to a host of others). Put at its very
bluntest the message was certainly clear:
Our country is now faced with a momentous decision. If we decide that
we are unable or unwilling effectively to assist in the reconstruction
Marshall, Moscow address, pp. 17-18.
2
Perloff, Alliance for Progress
,
p. xiii.





of western Europe, we must accept the consequences of its collapse






THE MARSHALL PLAN UNFOLDS
Introduction
Chapter II ended on the note that something must be done and done
quickly. The waiting game was quite obviously weighted in favor of the
Soviets and against the forces of reconstruction in western Europe. As
Secretary of State George C. Marshall had so accurately said: "The patient
is sinking while the doctors deliberate." It was axiomatic that if effec-
tive assistance was going to be forthcoming it would have to come from the
United States; it was equally self evident that virtually the full financial
burden would come to fall on the shoulders of the United States.
To make the situation even more critical, an event of some magnitude
had occurred some two weeks prior to the Moscow Meeting of the Big Four
Foreign Ministers in March and April of 1947. Namely the United Kingdom
had announced confidentially to the United States that they could no longer
guarantee the security of the eastern Mediterranean region. The United
States stepped in to help both Turkey and Greece in what effectively became
the first containment of communism. The author will hereinafter refer to
the Greece and Turkey incidents only as they directly relate to the Marshall
Plan. It must be pointed out that these events only served to strengthen
the beliefs in not only the United States but in western Europe as well,




that coexistence between East and West was going to be difficult, and that
any prospects for sincere cooperation on any substantial issue were swiftly
turning into an ephemeral dream.
The Harvard Speech
The time was ripe for the speech which was to mark a watershed in
our foreign policy.
But the timing of a public statement, he /Marshall/ felt, required
careful consideration. The moment, in relation to the situation a-
broad--and at home, where apprehension over the European situation was
mounting but isolationist opposition could be expected--must be such
that the proposal would break with "explosive force". ... It is easy
to propose a great plan, but exceedingly difficult to manage the form
and procedure so that it has a fair chance of political survival.
The propitious moment described above was to be June 5, 1947, the
site: Harvard University. It must be mentioned that no information con-
cerning the speech was sent to the governments of the countries of western
Europe for fear that any such early leakage might prompt criticism of an
unwarranted nature. The speech is quoted in its most significant parts as
follows:
I need not tell you gentlemen that the world situation is dangerous. . .
I think one difficulty is that the problem is one of such enormous com-
plexity that the very mass of facts presented to the public by press
and radio make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to
reach a clear appraisement of the situation. ... In considering the
requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe, the physical loss of
life, the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines and railroads
was correctly estimated, but it has become obvious during recent months
that this visible destruction was probably less serious that the dislo-
cation of the entire fabric of European economy.
. . . The breakdown of
the business structure of Europe during the war was complete. . . .
The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next
three or four years of foreign food and other essential products—prin-
cipally from America—are so much greater than her present ability to
pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic,
social and political deterioration of a very grave character. The rem-
edy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of





the European people in the economic future of their own countries and
of Europe as a whole. ... It is logical that the United States
should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal
economic health in the world, without which there can be no political
stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any
country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and cha-
os. ... It is already evident that before the United States Govern-
ment can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation
and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must
be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements
of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in
order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by
this government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this
government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to
place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of Europe-
ans. The initiative, I think,_must come from Europe^ . . . The program
should be a joint one. . . . _/the United States mus_t/ face up to the
vast responsibility which history has clearly placed on our country.
The Marshall Plan had been, if not technically born, at least offi-
cially conceived. President Truman publicly approved of the Marshall pro-
posal on June 11, 1947, in an address at Ottawa.
Response
Initial response in the United States was understandably mixed.
Many considered the Marshall Plan to be philanthropy of the highest and
most noble order; others, strengthened in their beliefs by numerous reports
of improper administration of previous foreign aid programs, were generally
against any "give away" project. The cost of the proposed program must have
been running through everyone's mind. Hartnett and Payzs bluntly tell us:
"The aid Europe wants will add eight billion dollars to America's tax bill
in 1948. That is two-fifths of the total sum paid in personal income
2
tax." On the subject of cost Secretary Marshall was later to tell the
George C. Marshall, European Initiative Essential to Economic
Recovery
,
Department of State Publication No. 2882 (Washington D. C.:
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Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that the: "... proposed program
does involve some sacrifice on the part of the American people, but . . .
this program should be viewed as an investment in peace. In these terms,
the cost is low."
But more important, perhaps, than the reaction on the homefront to
the proposed program, was the response in Europe. It was, by any standard,
positive. After a few days to gather his thoughts on the proposal, French
Foreign Minister Georges Bidault invited his British counterpart Mr. Bevin
to meet with him in Paris for the purpose of discussing the matter. It was
decided early in their talks, which began on June 13th, to include the
Soviet Government in their project of submitting a reply to the United
States. Messrs. Bevin and Bidault did meet later that month with Mr.
Molotov but a familiar dialogue repeated itself, i.e. no agreement could be
reached once again between East and West as to the reply to Secretary
Marshall. The French and British proposed a steering committee whose func-
tion it would be to coordinate the work of subcommittees set up to examine
resource levels and propose an outline for recovery. The Russians felt
that such a set-up would involve interfering in the affairs of each nation
and therefore counter-proposed that each nation make its own surveys and
plans. The British and French stuck to their cooperative approach. The
Soviets stuck to their individual approach, and when: ". . . it became
clear that they could not be pried from this position, the Soviet delegation
2
withdrew."
The withdrawal of the U.S.S.R. was unfortunate in the sense that it
marked somewhat conclusively and finally the end of any possible cooperation
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on the entire subject of European economic recovery. The development must
not have come as any great surprise to Secretary Marshall back in
Washington, or for that matter to Bidault and Bevin in Paris. Despite the
unfortunate aspects just touched upon, the Soviet withdrawal, had the effect
of clearing the air. No longer forced to work with an uncooperative neigh-
bor the countries of France and Britain, and for that matter all of the
countries of western Europe, could now seriously turn to the work at hand.
European Initiative
The day after the breakdown of the conference in Paris, Foreign
Ministers Bidault and Bevin issued a joint communique to twenty-two other
European nations to send representatives to Paris for the purpose of cooper-
ating on the subject of economic recovery. When roll was called at the
first meeting on July 12, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, all were represented. These
countries became the "Sixteen-Power Conference."
The sixteen-power conference, for which preparations had been rapid-
ly made, got off to a good start because of a number of reasons. The com-
mon desire for economic recovery must certainly be cited, as should the
sincere feeling that it would only be through cooperation that a viable
solution might be reached. Ironically enough, it was a product of the war
which helped the sixteen nations in their cooperative efforts. Many of the
countries in question had had "governments in exile" *in London during the
war and the men had worked quite extensively together. There had been, in
addition, a great many collaborative efforts in Washington all of which had
The subject of Soviet reaction to the Marshall Plan will be treat-
ed later in this chapter.
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a cumulative effect of fostering the sort of joint effort which was so
obviously going to be required. Price feels that inasmuch as this new "ex-
ercise" called for liaison and mutual confidence of an unprecedented nature,
the wartime (and postwar) collaborations played a signal role in setting
the requisite climate for the conference.
The first order of business for the sixteen-power conference was to
set up an interim Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC) whose
function it would be to probe and analyze the economic posture and produc-
tive capability of each of the sixteen nations. The results of this effort
could then serve as the basis for determining, at least in a preliminary
way, what each country would need in the way of assistance and what it
might expect to accomplish.
Technical committees were also established covering food and agricul-
ture, fuel and power, iron and steel, and transportation. Additional
committees were later formed to deal with timber, manpower, balance of
payments, and a committee of financial experts to examine means of re-
moving financial obstacles to intra- European trade.
On September 22, the CEEC finished its work and in its proposal to
the United States Government it outlined a four-year program designed to
promote and foster economic recovery in the participating nations. More
specifically in the General Report each participating country pledged
itself:
1. To develop its production to reach the targets set, especially for
food and coal.
2. To make the fullest and most effective use of its existing produc-
tive capacity and all available manpower.
3. To modernize its equipment and transportation, so that labor will
become more productive, conditions of work are improved, and
standards of living of all peoples of Europe 'are raised.
4. To apply all necessary measures leading to the rapid achievement
lprice
> The Marshall Plan , p. 36.
o
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of internal monetary and economic stability while maintaining in
each country a high level of employment.
5. To cooperate with one another and like-minded countries in all
possible steps to reduce tariffs and other barriers to the expansion
of trade both between themselves and with the rest of the world, in
accordance with principles of the International Trade Organization.
6. To remove progressively the obstacles to the free movement of per-
sons within Europe.
7. To organize together the means by which common resources can be
developed in partnership.
By these means and provided that the necessary supplies and materi-
als could be obtained from overseas, the Report claimed that European re-
covery could and would be achieved. As to the respective roles to be played
by the donor and donees, the following words of Premier Bidault well de-
scribed the special relationship:
I might recall that in French victory and in French defeat at Marengo,
at Waterloo, the decisive role was played by several thousand men who
arrived at the last moment. It was the decisive role but not the prin-
cipal role. As to the principal role, we _/the Europeans/ will assume
it, each of us. . . . The United States is the several thousand men who
will decide the battle and victory against misery.
The four-year program as drafted by the CEEC established the follow-
ing specific production targets for the participant countries:
1. Restoration of pre-war bread, grain and other cereal production,
large increases above pre-war levels in sugar and potatoes, some
increases in oils and fats, and as fast an expansion in livestock
products as supplies of feeding stuffs will allow.
2. Increase of coal output to 584,000,000 tons i.e., 145,000,000 tons
above the 1947 level (an increase of one third) and 30,000,000 tons
above the 1938 level.
3. Expansion of electricity output by nearly 70,000,000 kilowatt hours,
or 407 above 1947 and an expansion of generating capacity of over
25,00,000 kilowatts, or two-thirds above pre-war.
4. Development of oil refining capacity in terms of crude oil by
70,000,000 tons to two and a half times the pre-war level.
5. Increase of crude steel production by 807o above 1947 to a level of
55,000,000 tons or 10,000,000 (207.) above 1938.
•••Committee of European Economic Cooperation, General Report
,
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6. Expansion of inland transport facilities to carry a 25% greater
load in 1951 than in 1938.
7. Restoration by 1951 of the pre-war tonnage of the merchant fleets
of the participating countries.
8. Supply from European production of most of the capital equipment
needed for these expansions.
1
That the sixteen countries should get together at all and accept
the principle of mutual aid was to many observers an event of historic and
unprecedented significance.
Not only have they met and analyzed the European problem together,
which seldom happened before, but they have set specific production
goals.
. . . and they have undertaken to try to finance the most of
the capital equipment for these enlarged production goals out of their
own capital. . . . Here are a number of states who seldom cooperated
with one another in large-scale international economic and political
projects, sitting down together and studying the problem of Europe as
a whole, planning a joint production program. . . . Here are some of
the most prominent of the victors and the neutrals and the vanquished
listing themselves together as casualties of the war and appealing to
the United States to save them from chaos. It is an altogether stag-
gering proposition.
In all fairness it must be pointed out that criticisms were lodged
against the Paris report, some of which at least, were based on ostensible
truth and common sense:
It will be said that Europe does not need this much money to survive, .
. . It can and will be said that the Paris report overlooked the atti-
tude of the European farmers, who are hoarding food, causing misery
and hunger in the urban areas of the Continent, and selling their pre-
cious commodities on the black market for the benefit not of the hungry
but the well-fed. ... It can, and will be said, also, that the
European states have not really "committed" themselves to anything
at Paris-- in the sense that they can be made to carry out the commit-
ments.
But in the balance it must be allowed that the CEEC with its six-
teen representative nations did in fact achieve major accomplishments in
a remarkably short time.
^•Hartnett and Payzs, The Marshall Plan
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Before looking at the groundwork which, in the meantime was being
laid in the United States, it is necessary to dwell for a moment on the
Soviet reaction to the CEEC. As has already been demonstrated the U.S.S.R.
was in absolutely no hurry to see the economic recovery of western Europe
become fact. Lack of Soviet cooperation at virtually all multi-national
meetings had been the rule rather than the exception. The most recent
example had occurred when Mr. Molotov, as previously mentioned, walked
out of the Paris meeting called by Premiers Bidault and Bevin. The
Russian position had been one of demanding that the United States Government
specifically define the actual extent and nature of the aid it was promis-
ing. The Soviet Government also insisted that: ". . .no foreign inter-
ference in the affairs of the economic restoration of the countries of
Europe can naturally be tolerated, because internal economic problems are
the sovereign affair of each country, each nation.
No sooner had Mr. Molotov walked out on the Paris "Big Three"
meeting, than the U.S.S.R. sent letters to fourteen nations stating its
views on the Marshall Plan. As a result of the letters Albania, Bulgaria,
Finland, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia all refused the invitation of
Premiers Bidault and Bevin to participate in Paris. Two other countries
must also be mentioned to make the tally complete. Poland and
Czechoslovakia both initially accepted but under Soviet pressure with-
drew. 2
Simultaneously PRAVDA and TASS began to charge the United States
ln Soviet Criticism of the Marshall Plan," World Report , III, No. 5
(July 29, 1947) p. 39.




with all manner of accusations ranging from the desire to colonize western
Europe, to meddling in the affairs of sovereign nations and to striving to
prolong our postwar boom. Needless to say these harsh criticisms did not
go unnoticed or unanswered:
We are aware of the seriousness and extent of the campaign which is be-
ing directed against us as one of the bulwarks of western civilization.
. . .
We do not propose to stand by and watch the disintegration of
the international community to which we belong. *
The Communist propaganda against the Marshall Plan was soon accom-
panied by other actions. On July 6, the Cominform, a new organization,
was established representing Communists of nine countries: Russia, France
Yugoslovia, Italy, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania.
The Cominform included in its Manifesto:
. . . that the United States and Great Britain are leading an imperi-
alistic campaign against the democracies of eastern Europe. . . . The
Truman-Marshall Plan is only a farce, a European branch of the general
world plan of political expansion being relized by the United States
of America in all parts of the world.
^
As a result of the Cominform a series of negotiated trade agree-
ments involving barter arrangements and grain aid were put into effect
between the U.S.S.R. and its satellite states. Known as the Molotov Plan
they did serve to divert a good size volume of trade which heretofore had
flowed to western Europe.
Groundwork at Home
While the CEEC was feverishly preparing its report to the United
States, a complementary effort was being undertaken in the United States.
•'Marshall, European Revival and German and Austrian Peace
Settlements
, p. 14.
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On June 22, 1947, President Truman appointed three committees to examine
the basic questions involved in the general area of European recovery.
The first of these committees was charged with the responsibility of study-
ing our own resources with the view of being able to determine an ability
to support a recovery program. This first committee was chaired by
Secretary of the Interior Krug. The second committee had a goal closely
allied to that of the first, namely, what would be the impact on our econ-
omy of a recovery program. This committee was made up of the members of
the Council of Economic Advisers and came to be known as the Nourse
Committee. The third and final committee (ultimately called the Harriman
Committee) had a more general charter which called for it to: "... de-
termine the limits within which the United States could safely and wisely
extend aid to western Europe. ni Although the Harriman Committee report is
perhaps the most celebrated of the three, we should consider first the
Krug Report because it furnished the data upon which the Harriman Committee
decided that the United States could, in fact, export enough goods and
materials to carry out what was to become the Marshall Plan.
The Krug Report
The Krug Committee noted that our economy was operating at the
highest peacetime level in our history ($204 billion in 1946) and that this
high-level production meant that we were quite close to fully utilizing our
our plants and equipment. 2 The Committee went on to point out that our
•President's Committee on Foreign Aid, European Recovery and
American Aid
,
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exhaustible natural resources were being used up faster than ever before.
Notwithstanding the criticality of the two items just mentioned, the Krug
Committee felt that we could export enough goods to substantially aid
western Europe. Five goods or categories of goods, however, were felt to
be of a critical nature: (1) food, especially cereals and in particular
wheat; (2) fertilizer, especially nitrogen fertilizer; (3) coal; (4) steel;
and (5) mechanical equipment. The Krug Committee felt that of these five
goods the single most critical one was steel, primarily because many of
our own steel mills were already sitting idle for lack of scrap and pig
iron. It is interesting and worthy of note that while the Krug Report
felt the critical good to be steel, the Harriman Committee felt, as we shall
see in a moment, that the output of coal was uppermost on the list of pri-
orities. In summary the Krug Report declared that the economy of the United
States could provide the resources for a considerable program of foreign
aid without jeopardizing either our national security or our standard of
living.
The Nourse Report
The Council of Economic Advisers made public its "Nourse Report"
(named after the chairman of the Council) on November 1, 1947. Essen-
tially a short report (43 pages of text plus a 20-odd page statistical
appendix) it made clear from the onset, page 2 to be exact, that: "It is
no part of our task to evaluate the size or character of the European
need--that being a part of the task of the committee of citizens under the
chairmanship of the Secretary of Commerce."^- The Nourse Committee set
^-Council of Economic Advisers, The Impact of Foreign Aid Upon The
Domestic Economy
, a report to the President of the United States (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 2.
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itself the task of analyzing whether or not a Large scale program of the
type envisioned would throw our own economic system off the track. It
addressed the topic of inflation directly and head on. Many feared that
to increase production even further to satisfy a European demand would
certainly result in serious inflation because of present near-capacity pro-
duction, but the Nourse Report felt that foreign buying had to be kept in
proper perspective and that: ". . . looking at the economy generally, price
inflation in this country has arisen mainly from other sources. "*• Looking
beyond 1948 which was to be the biggest year of the Plan, the Nourse
Report said: "... the impact of the demand created by foreign aid is
likely to be less inflationary as time goes on. . . . /and/ while the size
of the export surplus has certainly created some problems, these problems
have not prevented us from moving to unprecedented levels of domestic em-
ployment. "^ The Nourse Committee, as had the Krug Committee, stressed the
importance of managing key commodities extremely carefully. By way of
summary, the Nourse Report stated:
In the long run, the economic restoration of Europe will benefit our
own economy by enabling us to obtain more goods by advantageous trade.
On the other hand, a cessation of foreign aid would force an economic
reorientation of Europe which would be detrimental to our economy.
3
The Harriman Report
Notwithstanding the fine work of the Krug and Nourse Committees,
it was to fall on the shoulders of the Harriman Committee to anticipate
the problems that would arise and to lay a groundwork for a sound program.







The caliber of individuals chosen to be in the nine teen-member group was
truly that of "distinguished citizen." With the exception of W. Averell
Harriman who was the Secretary of Commerce, the rest of the group was from
the "outside." Presidents of corporations and universities made up the
membership together with labor and farming experts and the list was truly
of "blue ribbon" quality. It is significant that at the very beginning of
the Committee's Report it is emphatically stated: "We believe that the
future of western Europe lies very much in its own hands. No amount of
outside aid, however generous, can by itself restore to health the economies
of the sixteen nations which met at Paris in July." I shall return later
to the concept of self-help for in it, I believe, lies one of the principal
reasons for the Marshall Plan's success.
On the basis of revised estimates of European imports and exports, the
Committee calculates that the cost of the European Aid program to the
Government of the United States would be about 5.75 billions of dollars
for the first year, and, in round numbers, between 12 and 17 billion
dollars for the whole program here suggested.
The Report went on to point out that these figures did not agree
with those of the Paris CEEC report: "The Paris estimates of imports have
to be revised downward, mainly on the grounds of unavailability of foods."
Morever the Committee thought that the International Bank and private fi-
nancing could shoulder part of the burden.
The basic conclusions of the Harriman Committee may be summarized
as follows:
1. The hope of western Europe depends primarily on the industry and
straight thinking of its own people.









2. The United States has a vital interest—humanitarian, economic,
strategic, and political--in helping the participating countries to
achieve economic recovery.
3. The aid which the United States gives will impose definite sacri-
fice on this country.
4. The magnitude of western Europe's deficit with the American conti-
nent in 1948 will be of the order of 7 billion dollars, but when
all possibilities of financing are taken into consideration, the
approximate need for appropriations past and future to cover the
calendar year of 1948 may be of the order of 5.75 billion dollars.
5. The extension of such aid, now or in the future, calls for anti-
inflationary fiscal policies on the part of this country, and a new
agency to administer the aid extended.
*
The Harriman Committee admonished that:
... it is well to bear in mind that success depends on giving way
neither to over-optimism or to undue pessimism. It is one thing to
propose a program, it is another to see it through. The immediate
months and indeed years ahead are not apt to be easy either for this
country or for the European nations. It is not wise to underescimate
the steepness of the climb.
2
One final point about the Harriman Committee Report must be made.
The report stressed that the financing of the program must be through tax-
ation and not through Government borrowing.
It should be mentioned at this juncture that while the three com-
mittees just mentioned were busily going about their work, extensive
groundwork by the executive agencies was being laid, partly in support of
the three committees, and also to the end of translating the Marshall Plan
from a broad concept to a specific, workable program which could be pre-
sented to the Congress.
Congress and the Herter Report
Congress had not been slow to react on the subject of the Marshall
Plan. As Hartnett and Payzs point out:





As Congress was in session when Secretary Marshall made his June 5th
proposal, its members quickly laid plans to unearth the relevant facts
for themselves. The fact that the Republican Party controls both
branches of our national legislature no doubt contributes to their de-
cision to investigate the European situation independently of the
studies made by agents of the Democratic executive branch.
Congressional "look-see" took many shapes including European trips
by some 200 members of Congress to witness first-hand the plight of Europe.
"But the most important Congressional investigating body proved to be the
2
House Select Committee on Foreign Aid." With a membership of nineteen,
the Committee had Representative Christian Herter of the Ways and Means
Committee as its executive head and came to be known as the Herter Commit-
tee. In short, the Herter Report enumerated the following basic requisites
of a program of foreign aid:
1. The production of food and other materials must be increased by the
recipient countries.
2. Economic cooperation must be facilitated by the recipient countries
themselves.
3. Certain countries other than the United States should be expected
to cooperate.
4. Private initiative must be encouraged to assume to emergency activ-
ities.
5. Fiscal policies and financial and monetary programs should be a-
dopted to restore confidence in their currencies.
6. Publicity as to the use made of the aid furnished should be given
by the recipient countries to the United States.-*
The extensive traveling done by the members of the Committee, the
interest that they shared in this serious matter and the copious homework
which was obviously done were to become the background for the hearings
about to take place in the Congress.
lHartnett and Payzs, The Marshall Plan, p. 30.
2 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
3House Select Committee on Foreign Aid, Proposed Principles and
Organization for Any Program of Foreign Aid
,
Report No. 8 of November 25,
1947 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 4.

35
Role of The President
The message of the President to the Congress on December 19, 1947,
served as the official prologue to the hearings and debate which were to
follow and it deserves to be quoted in applicable part:
In proposing that the Congress enact a program of aid to Europe, I am
proposing that this Nation contribute to world peace and to its own
security by assisting in the recovery of sixteen countries which, like
the United States, are devoted to the preservation of free institutions
and enduring peace among nations. ... In providing aid to Europe we
must share more than goods and funds. We must give our moral support
to those nations in their struggle to rekindle the fires of hope and
strength and the will of their peoples to overcome their adversities.
The President recommended that Congress authorize the appropiation
of 17 billion dollars from April 1, 1947 to June 30, 1952 of which 6.8
billion dollars should be actually appropriated in time to cover the 15
month period of April 1, 1948 to June 30, 1949. More specifically, Presi-
dent Truman stated that the program was designed:
1. To make genuine recovery possible within a definite period of time.
2. To insure that the funds and foods we furnish be used most effec-
tively for their purpose.
3. To minimize the financial cost to us and at the same time to avoid
placing crushing financial burdens on Europe.
4. To conserve our physical resources and minimize the impact of the
program on our economy.
5. To harmonize with our existing international relationships and re-
sponsibilities.
6. To provide wise and efficient administration.
Simultaneously with the President's Message to Congress on Decem-
ber 19, 1947, the Secretary of State submitted to the Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to the Chairman of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, a draft bill embodying the foreign-aid program. The
short title of the proposed Act was the "Economic Cooperation Act of 1948."








A Time for Decision
The time had come for decision. It was to be the sort of decision
which, as Senator Vandenberg later said, truly tried men's souls. To add
yet another very real dimension to the situation as it existed in the early
days of 1948 it must be remembered that 1948 was an election year. It goes
without saying that this fact was not lost on the Democratic Administration
or on the Republican Congress.
Meanwhile, a growing number of citizens were becoming aware that with-
out prompt and widespread support the proposal for a large new aid
program would encounter heavy opposition in Congress and that failure
might be disastrous. Private organizations, in increasing number, be-
came actively interested, and ... in late 1947 a special citizens'
Committee for the Marshall Plan was organized to inform the American
people of the facts and issues and to enlist their support for the pro-
gram. 1
This is not to say that there were not opponents to the proposed
program. The American Labor Party, the National Economic Council and the
American Coalition among others were opposed to the European Recovery Pro-
gram.
It is altogether fitting that we should look first at the testimony
of Secretary Marshall before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. He
expresses so well what many, who followed him in the hearings which lasted
the next several months, were to repeat in less eloquent terms:
A nation in which the voice of its people directs the conduct of its
affairs cannot embark on an undertaking of such magnitude and signif-
icance for light or purely sentimental reasons. Decisions of this
importance are dictated by the highest considerations of national in-
terest. There are none higher, I am sure, than the establishment of
enduring peace and the maintenance of true freedom for the individual.
... I ask that the European recovery program be. judged in these terms
and on this basis. . . . Without the reestablishment of economic health
and vigor in the free countries of Europe. Without the restoration of
their social and political strength necessarily associated with eco-
nomic recoperation, the prospect for the American people, and for free




people everywhere, to find peace with justice and well-being and secu-
rity for themselves and their children will be gravely prejudiced.
The Secretary of State did not fail to point out that the program
would be a costly one but simply stated that its cost was an investment for
the future:
This program will cost our country billions of dollars. It will impose
a burden on the American taxpayer. It will require sacrifices today
in order that we may enjoy security and peace tomorrow. Should the
Congress approve the program for European recovery, as I urgently rec-
ommend, we Americans will have made an historic decision of our peace-
time history.
2
As to the chances for the program's success, the Secretary was not
so naive as to think it would not be an uphill climb, one frought with mon-
umental problems, but then Secretary Marshall felt that the alternative was
clearly and absolutely unacceptable:
What are the prospects of success of such a program for the economic
recovery of a continent? It would be absurd to deny the existence of
obstacles and risks. . . . All we can say is this program does provide
the means for success and if we maintain the will for success I believe
that success will be achieved. To be quite clear, this unprecedented
endeavor of the new world to help the old is neither sure nor easy. It
is a calculated risk. But there can be no doubts as to the alterna-
tives. The way of life we have known is literally in balance.
3
A few days later on January 12, 1948, the Secretary testified before
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs using essentially the same arguments
on behalf of the European Recovery Program as he had before the Senate
Committee.
On the subject of the hearings which followed, suffice it to say
that they present a voluminous record. Those before the Senate Committee
totalled over 1,400 pages; those before the House Committee totalled over









2,200 pages. It is interesting to note that of the approximately 270 in-
dividuals heard, only 34 (less than 157,) were government personnel. The
hearings brought into focus the entire range of issues concerned. The bill
after being marked up was ready for presentation to Congress.
On the floor of the Senate the brilliant oratory of one-time "iso-
lationist" Senator Vandenberg stands cut in particular. It was before a
packed Senate that Senator Vandenberg rose to deliver his major address in
support of the Marshall Plan:
. . . Mr. President, the decision which here concerns the Senate is the
kind that tries men's souls. I understand and share the anxieties in-
volved. It would be a far happier circumstance if we could close our
eyes to reality, comfortably retire within our bastions, and dream of
an isolated and prosperous peace. But that which was once our luxury
would now become our folly. . . . There are no blueprints to guarantee
results. We are entirely surrounded by calculated risks. I profoundly
believe that the pending program is the best of these risks.
*
How true is Price's observation that:
The drama that precedes a momentous legislative decision is only faintly
reflected in the enactment which finally emerges. This is particularly
true of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 authorizing the Marshall
Plan operation.
2
While majority support was apparently certain, this in no way pre-
vented sharp and lengthy criticism. Senator George W. Malone, for example,
held the floor for two days in opposition. When the votes were finally
taken, the count in favor of adoption was 69 to 17 in the Senate and 329
to 74 in the House of Representatives. The Republican vote in support of
the Marshall Plan was 31 to 13 in the Senate and 171 to 63 in the House.
•3
The Democratic tally was 38 to 4 in the Senate and 158 to 11 in the House.
Differences were resolved in conference, the act was promptly approved in
^United States Senate, Senator Vandenberg speaking for the Marshall
Plan, March 1, 1948, Congressional Record
, pp. 1981-1986.













FIFTY- ONE MONTHS TOWARDS ECONOMIC RECOVERY
Introduction
Although April 3, 1948, is remembered as the date marking the offi-
cial beginning of the Marshall Plan, in point of fact a great deal of admin-
istrative groundwork had already been started. In an article entitled
"Reminiscences of the Marshall Plan," C. Tyler Wood (now Special Assistant
to the Director of the Agency for International Development) recalls:
At about this same_time ^summer of 1947/ Mr. Clayton _/then an Assistant
Secretary of State/ had things moving in new directions in Washington.
He asked me to head an informal group we called the "board of direc-
tors", which was set up after Secretary George Marshall's speech at
Harvard on June 5, 1947, to lay plans for the carrying out of the Euro-
pean Recovery Program, which came to be known as the Marshall Plan. . .
. We met every other night in a conference room of the old State Depart-
ment Building.
*
The ground had been prepared for the planting of the seed. The act
which gave life to the Marshall Plan on April 3, 1948, provided for the
necessary mechanism to administer the gigantic enterprise. The Economic
Cooperation Administration (E.C.A.) was the newly-created vehicle to imple-
ment the law and its headquarters was to be in Washington.
Appointment of the First Administrator
The April 3, 1948 legislation provided that the E.C.A. would be
^"Reminiscences of the Marshall Plan", Front Lines





headed by an Administrator appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. The bill related the Administrator of E.C.A. to
the Secretary of State in the following way: "All those functions of the
Administration ^E.C.A^/ which affect the conduct of the foreign policy of
the United States shall be performed subject to the direction and control
of the Secretary of State." 1
Three days after passage of the act, President Truman appointed
Paul G. Hoffman to be Administrator. Mr. Hoffman had been a self-made busi-
nessman who had risen through the ranks of the Studebaker Corporation to
become its president in 1935. President Truman's initial choice for the
post was former Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson but when the President
consulted Senator Vandenberg on this matter, it became clear that the Re-
publican majority in Congress wanted a man with a broad business (as opposed
to government) background and preferably a Republican. Since the name of
Hoffman was apparently near the top of every list of possible candidates,
Senator Vandenberg was able to assure the President that Hoffman's appoint-
ment would be quickly endorsed by the Senate. President Truman nominated
Paul Hoffman on April 6, 1948. Three days later on April 9, Mr. Hoffman
was sworn into office.
Reduced to its simplest terms, Mr. Hoffman had a two-sided problem
to solve, neither part of which could be postponed. On the one hand, the
immediate and adequate economic support to a very wobbly Europe was, of
^Hartnett and Payzs, The Marshall Plan
,
p. 48.
Mr. Hoffman's long career as a leader of industry and distinguished
public servant was not to end when he left the E.C.A. in 1951. In 1951, he
was made president of the Ford Foundation; in 1954 he returned to the busi-
ness world as chairman of the board of the Studebaker-Packard Corporation.
He subsequently left Studebaker-Packard to serve at the United Nations where




course, the purpose behind the Marshall Plan in the first place. But al-
most of equal importance, Mr. Hoffman was faced with setting up the proper
mechanism which could efficiently and effectively handle the four-year,
multi-billion dollar program. Price interviewed Mr. Hoffman at the time
and quoted him as candidly admitting that: ". . . of course I was appalled
by the job. No one had a blueprint." 1
Selection of Key Staff
With temporary offices in the Statler Hotel in Washington, Mr.
Hoffman proceeded to put together his immediate staff. The list reads like
a page out of "Who's Who" and included among others: Maurice T. Moore,
president of Time magazine; Edward Mason, Dean of the Harvard School of
Public Administration; and Wayne Taylor, ex-president of the Export- Import
Bank. Several of the men in question had been members of the Harriman Com-
mittee and therefore were already well "up to speed" on the range and depth
of problems involved. For the job of "Special Representative in Europe"^
Mr. Hoffman, aware that President Truman wanted a Democrat, recommended
Averell Harriman or Lew Douglas (the latter then our ambassador to Great
Britain). The President chose Harriman and as Harriman 1 s assistant in
Paris, Mr. William C. Foster who had achieved an outstanding reputation as
an administrator while serving as Under Secretary of Commerce. The "first
team" had been chosen.
iprice, The Marshall Plan
, p. 74.
^The law stipulated that the Special Representative in Europe would
have the rank of Ambassador and would serve as the chief representative of
the United States government to any organization of participating countries




Among the first major decisions made by Mr. Hoffman and his staff
was to not engage directly in the purchase of materials and supplies. Pro-
curement, instead, was handled by the recipient governments and by private
firms of the participating countries. Apart from not requiring what would
have had to be a sizeable procurement operation in view of the dollars to
be spent, the decision not to engage directly in the purchasing arena also
served to foster the use of private international trade channels.
It must be stressed that while the procurement process was not han-
dled by E.C.A. , that Administration did not, however, relinquish control
over the requests submitted by the governments of the participating coun-
tries. A procedure which came to be known as the "PA system" (for Procure-
ment Authorization) evolved by which applications for a commodity were
submitted by country representatives in Washington, reviewed by the E.C.A.
(to determine if they conformed to established criteria, whether or not
substitutions could be made, and what effect the proposed procurement would
have on our economy) and, if approved, a letter of commitment would be is-
sued to cooperating bank guaranteeing reimbursement for the credit ex-
tended. While this review procedure at first glance may seem excessively
burdensome, it served to provide the E.C.A. with the detailed information
which was needed to present to the Congress and to the American people as
evidence that assistance funds were being used for essential purposes and
that tight internal accounting procedures were being observed.
One cannot discuss the functioning of the system without examining
the role played by counterpart funds. Mr. Joseph L. Newman (then with the
E.C.A. and now with the Agency for International Development) feels that
the concept of counterpart funds was a major contributory factor to the
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success of the mechanics of the system. To review briefly, the counter-
part fund system worked as follows: when a French farmer, for example,
needed a certain type of implement such as a tractor, he would "order it"
and pay for it in French francs, the francs going into a special account;
in the meantime the tractor would be built in the United States and the
E.C.A. would pay the U.S. tractor manufacturer for his product; the tractor
would then be shipped to the French farmer who would put it to use; at the
same time, the E.C.A. would permit the French government to spend the farm-
er's francs (earmarked from the beginning and for all intents and purposes
in escrow) on the rebuilding of a bridge, the construction of a plant or
some other E.C.A. -approved project. Mr. Newman points out that the dollars
did "double duty" as the vernacular of the day called it: money was pumped
into our own economy and at the same time a critical reconstruction project
in France became a reality.
As mentioned early in this chapter the E.C.A. was charged with coor-
dinating all foreign-policy-related matters with the Secretary of State.
This close liaison with the Department of State did not go uncriticized.
The Brookings Institution had come up with the idea that the E.C.A. should
function under an Administrator of Cabinet rank who would report to and be
directly responsible to the President. The Administrator would be advised
by an Advisor Board comprised of prominent citizens appointed by the Presi-
dent. Under the Brookings scheme there would have been a clear and absolute
dichotomy between the Secretary of State (who would have retained sole con-
trol of our foreign relations) and the Administrator of E.C.A. (who would
have had sole control of the economic side of the European Recovery Program.)




Both would have been equals by virtue of their cabinet ranks and disagree-
ments between them would have been solved at the Presidential level. While
the Brookings Institution plan did not find wholesale approval, many of its
minor proposals found their way into the everyday workings of the E.C.A.
The European office of the E.C.A. under the Special Representative
(Averell Harriman) deserves attention at this point. When Harriman accept-
ed the offer to head up the Paris office it was with the understanding that
he would be given a broad range of decision-making powers. The idea that
the Paris operation should be a small staff of key officials apparently did
not survive very long and in its place came just the opposite: a strong
European headquarters very similar in both organization and functions to its
Washington counterpart. Only the politically naive would wonder as to why
such a "parallel" organization was established in Paris to mirror the one
in Washington.
Never before had an overseas regional office been set up to play so
large a part in a peacetime operation of the United States government.
Two factors appear to have been chiefly responsible. One was the need
for a high-level branch of the E.C.A. to deal with the O.E.E.C-- the
joint European organization. The other was the necessity for an ar-
rangement acceptable to both the Republican-controlled Congress and the
Democratic Administration, giving exceptionally capable individuals
from the two parties top posts of nearly equal status. *-
Paralleling both the structure and pattern of the E.C.A. in Wash-
ington and the Office of the Special Representative in Paris, were our
respective country missions. The men who came to be the "chief of mission ,2
iprice, The Marshall Plan
, p. 76.
^The term "chief of mission" is now used by the Department of State
to refer to our ambassador in a given country. The ambassador in turn
heads up the "country team" which may include representatives from a number
of non-State Department Agencies (DOD, Agriculture, etc.) Technically and
perhaps more accurately the men in question might have been called "Chief
of the E.C.A. Mission."
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ranked second only to ambassador in each country. They were charged with
the responsibility for United States participation in the economic recovery
program for their particular country. The significance of overall direc-
tion of economic and technical work and the reviewing of the effects of
United States assistance in a given country resulted in what Price calls:
".
. . quasi-ambassadorial functions of day-to-day negotiations and con-
sultations with the participating governments. "'• The matter of giving the
E.C.A. mission chief the prestige of the "number two" position in our large
embassies in western Europe caused no small amount of "weeping and wailing"
among career foreign officers. In hindsight, however, notwithstanding the
temporarily damaged prestige and ruffled feathers, the superimposition of
non-foreign service officers at such a high level in our embassies served
to insure top-level attention to this project.
Organization for European Economic Cooperation
In the meantime, the leaders of the western European countries were
hard at work shaping an organization which would be complimentary to the
E.C.A. and the Office of the Special Representative. "The sixteen European
countries early recognized that they needed a unified European counterpart
to the American administration for aid to Europe. "^ The Committee of Euro-
pean Economic Cooperation, which the summer before had done such a tremen-
dous job in coming up with a proposed "game plan" for economic recovery,
reconvened in March of 1948 (in anticipation of successful passage of the
European Recovery Program in our Congress) to plan a more permanent vehicle
iprice, The Marshall Plan
, p. 78.




of cooperation. Three committees were set up: one, to draft a general
agreement of intentions and obligation; the second to examine legal and
administrative problems which might arise as a result of forming such a
permanent organization; and finally, one to consider the structure and
functions of the proposed body. The British concept of: ". . . an organ-
ization that would function as a continuous international conference, not
as a supranational body . . . prevailed." 1
The debates which followed as to the tone and structure of the pro-
posed organization, represented a "jockeying for position," particularly
on the part of the smaller countries. It is axiomatic that for centuries
the more powerful countries in the area had wielded a strong influence and
often- times direct control over the smaller nations. These smaller coun-
tries were this time determined that they should not be relegated to "back
seat" positions. The result was to be that out of the top three positions,
one (Secretary General) was held be France, the second (Chairman of the
Executive Committee) by Great Britain and the third (Chairman of the organ-
ization's top Council) by Belgium. Despite the "juggling" for power which
went on, a draft constitution was prepared and submitted to the Committee
on April 16, 1948. It is interesting to note that in adopting the consti-
tution, each nation pledged itself to essentially the same sort of goals to
which they had committed themselves a year before in responding to Secre-
tary of State Marshall's Harvard speech. ^ All of these events took place
within a remarkably short period of time and by early May the O.E.E.C. was
IPrice, The Marshall Plan
, p. 80.
^Briefly reiterated these goals were: a maximum increase in pro-
duction and trade, a multilateral system of payments, a reduction in eco-





The viability of the O.E e E.C, was given its first acid test just a
few weeks later. Baron Charles J. Snoy of Belgium was interviewed by Price
and was quoted as saying:
The most important episode in the early history of the O.E.E.C. came
when the Americans said: "You recommend the division of aid." We fear-
ed it would wreck the Organization. Yet it was possible. We had to
learn cooperation. No one could take the responsibility for jeopard-
izing the whole plan, even if dissatisfied with any particular decision.
It was a great lesson for us. We knew intellectually that this was
necessary.
1
The decision on the part of the United States to let the pie be
split by the recipient countries was as brilliant as it was daring. ^ The
pragmatic need for economic assistance fostered (perhaps "forced" would be
a better word) cooperation of a nature which had never before been known
in Europe. As Harnett and Payzs tell us: "These beginnings have a sig-
nificance beyond the four-year recovery program."^ This particular point
represents one of the signal concepts underlying the success of the Marshall
Plan and will be referred to again later in this thesis.
A Strong and Enthusiastic Start
E.C.A. operations started the very same day that Mr. Hoffman took
office (April 9, 1948) and two weeks later the freighter John H. Quick
sailed from Galveston, Texas to Bordeaux, France, its hull filled with
wheat marking the first shipment of goods under the Marshall Plan.
The atmosphere within the E.C.A. in those early days can best be
^rice, The Marshall Plan
, pp. 82-83.
2
"Interview, Joseph L. Newman (A.I.D.), Washington, D.C., August
24, 1971.





It is hard now to recapture the feeling of eagerness and esprit de
corps we all felt in those days. People thought nothing of working
around the clock. We had a sense of mission, a sense that we were
participating in one of the great movements of history. . . .*
These sentiments were mirrored almost exactly by Mr. Valerio
Montanari when he said: "The early days were characterized by long hours,
hard work, enthusiasm and the feeling that there was 'a great job to do in
a hurry. ' " 2
By June 30, 1948 (less than 90 days from the date the European Re-
covery Program had been enacted into law) a total of 1.3 billion dollars
had been obligated.-* Apparently in coming up with this figure Mr. Price
included not only the dollar value of goods shipped and amounts obligated,
but the value of loans under negotiation (plus those already completed and
approved) because in comparing his figures with official data there is a
significant discrepancy. Agency for International Development statistics
for the same period (April 3-June 30, 1948) reveal that 766 million dollars
(versus 1.3 billion dollars as reported by Price) in grants and loan au-
thorization were obligated. By way of explanation, it is quite possible
that a number of transactions counted by Price did not end up (for account-
ing purposes) in fiscal year 1948 because the funds were not officially
obligated until after 30 June and therefore ended up in the totals for the
^-''Reminiscences of the Marshall Plan," Front Lines , May 30, 1967,
P. 4.
^Interview, Valerio Montanari (A.I.D.), Washington, D.C., August
24, 1971.
3Price, The Marshall Plan
, p. 83.
^UoS. Agency for International Development, U.S. Economic Assistance
Programs, April 3, 1948-June 30, 1970 (Washington, D.C.: Agency for Inter-
national Development, 1971), p. 6.
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following fiscal year. But regardless of whether the figure was 1.3 bil-
lion dollars or 766 million dollars, the fact remains that an extraordinary
volume of business was transacted by the fledgling agency.
Leaving behind the first 90 days of operation and looking ahead to
the rest of the life span of the Marshall Plan, it quickly becomes apparent
that the program lends itself particularly well to a four-part, fiscal-
year-by-fiscal-year account. Principal among the reasons why this is the
case is that the nature of the program changed markedly each fiscal year.
The second main reason for a year-by-year examination of the European Re-
covery Program is that the appropriations came from the Congress on that
basis and the amounts in question changed significantly over the foar-year
period. Yet a third and final major reason for choosing such a seemingly
arbitrary division, is that the Korean War broke out at almost exactly the
half-way point in the Marshall Plan and its influence on the thrust of the
second half of the program is not only interesting but must necessarily be
examined if we are to get the complete picture.
1948 - 1949 (FY '49)
Early in the summer of 1948, each of the countries was tasked with
coming up with a plan of action to permit reaching a position of economic
independence by June 30, 1952. In addition to this four year plan which
necessarily was of a more general nature, the countries in question came
up with a highly-detailed proposed program for the first full year of
^Virtually the entire amount went for bulk commodities; less than
one per cent was spent on machinery and equipment.
^What was the first year a food and raw materials type of operation
later evolved into a tools and machinery sort of program and ultimately
(because of the Korean War) became a military-oriented assistance effort.
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operation. In making up their proposals the countries had to, among other
things:
. . .
decide whether the plan should be limited to imports financed
with American aid, or whether it should encompass a complete import
program for western Europe. The latter and bolder course was chosen,
since the role of the United States-financed imports could be intelli-
gently assessed only in the light of total anticipated imports, and
since the E.C.A. required a knowledge of prospective European resources
as a whole before it could justify the American aid needed.
More specifically the agricultural gains (over the previous years)
were forecasted to be as follows: bread grains 45 per cent; coarse grains
12 per cent; beet sugar 26 per cent; oil cake and meal 45 per cent. Coal
production was expected to climb 13 per cent, pig iron 68 per cent, and
crude steel 50 per cent. In other areas substantial increases over 1947
levels were expected in wood pulp (23 per cent), potash (29 per cent),
nitrogen-based fertilizer (27 per cent) and maritime tonnage (17 per cent).
To put the anticipated gains in perspective one should keep in mind that
as of 1947, all of the participating countries had been given an (neces-
sarily very rough) index of 88 using available statistics for 1938 to serve
as a base level of 100. While elctric power was already at an index fig-
ure of 144, other critical items were much lower than the aggregate level
of 88 which the O.E.E.C. had assigned. Bread grains, for example were at
62; meat production at 71; cement at 73; and steel and coal at 81 and 83
respectively. In other words a few items (such as the electric power out-
put) tended to bring up the average but as a result, may have distorted the
economic picture. By and large, the industrial items were better off than
were the agricultural commodities. We will look at these same commodities
^•Price, The Marshall Plan
, p. 94.
^Organization for European Economic Cooperation, Ninth Report of
the O.E.E.C, A Decade of Cooperation, Achievements, and Perspectives
(Paris: O.E.E.C, 1958) pp. 30-31.
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later to determine if they attained or surpassed their goals by June 30,
1952.
The preceding in essence represented the first annual program and
in its report to the E.C.A., the O.E.E.C. was able to make a boast of some
significance: "There exists in the Organization a means, unprecedented in
the scope and continuity of its work, for the members to grapple interna-
tionally and cooperatively with the practical problems of the European
economy."! This is an underlying theme of the greatest significance which
will be treated in some detail in Chapters V and VI.
By June 30, 1949, a total of $6,283 billion had either been granted
outright or loaned on a low- interest basis. ^ The ratio of grants to loans
during this particular period was approximately 4:1. The figure of $6,283
billion includes the three-months in fiscal year 1948 already mentioned,
during which $766 million had been obligated. The "clean" figure for fis-
cal year 1949 was $5,517 billion which was the biggest year of the program.
Two-thirds of the total amount had been spent in the United States; the
remaining third "offshore." Food, feed and fertilizer as a single cate-
gory accounted for 36 percent of the assistance; raw materials and semi-
finished products as another category added an additional 31 percent; when
you add in another 16 percent for fuel it is apparent that the first 15
months represented more of a relief effort than an economic recovery pro-
gram. Program emphasis was soon to change to machinery and vehicles-- tools
of true economic recovery.
^Organization for European Economic Cooperation, Report to the
Economic Cooperation Administration on the First Annual Programme (Paris:
O.E.E.C. , 1948), p. 15.





Production gains can be described quite simply. During the first
half of fiscal 1948 increases were disappointingly modest; during the sec-
ond half of the year, however, a strong recovery came into play. The
April-May-June quarter of 1949 sported an industrial output index of ap-
proximately 110.1 However, while industrial production for the entire
fiscal year was at approximately 103 (thanks primarily to the already-men-
tioned fourth quarter performance of 110), agricultural output was still
only at 93. Particularly strong advances were registered in West Germany,
Austria, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and Turkey. 3 There were signif-
icant gains in practically all areas although the agricultural items were
slower in coming back up to pre-war levels.
In the area of investment, the main thrust of the dollar aid was in
"productive" investments with priority given to power and transportation
and key industrial facilities. The intent was to build up those segments
of a nation's economy which were most crucial for early expansion in pro-
duction. The E.C.A. was heeding the advice of its staff economists when
this decision was made. Stated more formally, the E.C.A. made use of the
multiplier process: "... the initial increase in expenditure will gen-
erate a series of spendings and respendings, which, if carried far enough,
will raise income by some multiple of the original increment. "^ Needless
to say, there would have been a multiplier effect almost regardless of how
1-Many of the data were difficult to compare because some were pre-
sented on a fiscal year basis, others on a calendar year basis and yet
others as of a certain date.
o
Organization for European Economic Cooperation, Basic Statistics





^Wallace C. Peterson, Income, Employment and Economic Growth
,
(New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1967), p. 153.
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the aid money would have been spent; however, by concentrating investment
in key industries, the magnitude of the multiplier was amplified and the
cumulative effects upon income levels was many times more than the amount
actually spent. Although fiscal year 1949 assistance of $5,517 billion
represented only about 4 percent of western Europe's gross national product,^-
by virtue of the spending- respending effect of the multiplier, the end re-
sult was conservatively three times that amount. To keep the multiplier in
perspective, however, it would have to be admitted that: ". . . the multi-
plier has a time dimension, since it would be quite impossible in reality
for the whole series of spending and respending to occur simultaneously."^
Notwithstanding its time element, it is accurate to say that the multiplier
played a key role throughout the years of the Marshall Plan(and for some
years to follow.) One final note must be made on the investment picture:
approximately one half of all funds were of the counterpart variety already
described. Price feels that the use of counterpart: "... provided a
means for the exerting of some degree of American influence in the formu-
lation of investment programs. "*
While the progress made in the areas touched upon was significant
and satisfactory, it must be admitted that the picture in the area of trade
and tariffs was not as bright. The concept of protectionism was alive and
well and few of the countries, understandably enough, were willing to walk
into any of the negotiations with their country's economy in jeopardy. It
was not to be until the following fiscal year that major strides were made
in this area.
^-Howard S. Ellis, The Economics of Freedom (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1950), p. 38.




Price, The Marshall Plan, p. 99.

55
The first full year had come and gone and, in the balance, it had
been a good year for western Europe.
1949 - 1950 (FY' 50)
This 12-month period, compared to the others, was perhaps the
Marshall Plan at its best. Program emphasis had shifted from "relief" to
"growth"; the mechanism of the E.C.A. was well established and functioning
smoothly (if feverishly); real progress (vis-a-vis 1938) was made. And
yet another reason must be cited: this was to be (because of circumstances
beyond its control) its last year of operation untainted by the clouds of
war and military aggression. The end of fiscal year 1950 had for some time
been considered the half-way point; it was to become instead the point at
which economic assistance became military assistance.
As had been the case the previous year, elaborate plans were draft-
ed on the subject of goals to be achieved during the forthcoming year. In
addition to goals of an "economic growth" nature, the O.E.E.C. stated that
the year to come must be one of financial and monetary stability. Calendar
year 1948 had been one marked by rather severe inflation in many of the
western European countries (120 per cent in France in 18 months and 70 per
cent in Greece in 24 months for example) and in fact between 1947 and 1956
the overall level of prices in western Europe rose by nearly 60 per cent--
most of this rise occurring between 1947-1949. * The already-examined use
of counterpart funds with their attendant control by the United States was
to play a major role in helping to achieve the goals of financial and mon-
etary stability. By concentrating the use of counterpart funds on only








those projects which would advance the economy of a given country along a
broad and significant front, the E.C.A. was able to help shape the nature
of many investment programs in western Europe.
In terms of production, agriculture finally surpassed the index
figure of 100 (representing the 1938 levels) ending up at approximately
103; industrial production went to approximately 115 for the year as a
whole. Looking for a moment at the year-end levels rather than at the
averages for the whole year, by the end of the second full year, industrial
production had risen by more than one- fourth over post-war levels and agri-
cultural production by just under one-fourth (some individual products,
however, such as bread grains and dairy products were up by roughly one-
third). With a few notable exceptions (meat production and coal output)
the pre-war levels had finally been topped by the mid-point in the program.
Analyzed by country, the greatest strides made during the two and
a quarter years were by Germany (120 percent higher in June of 1950 than
in April of 1948), Sweden and Denmark (69 percent), the United Kingdom (49
percent) and Norway (47 percent).
It might be argued that it is "easy" to bring production back up
to where it once has been, and that the difficult part is to go beyond that
threshold and realize gains in productivity. Notwithstanding the merits
of that argument, it would nontheless have to be admitted that a great deal
had been accomplished in a short time. By year end (June 30, 1950)--the
midway point-- the United States contribution had totalled just under $10
billion--to be exact $9,897 billions of which $1,330 Billion represented
1-Organization for European Economic Cooperation, Basic Statistics
,
2Ibid., pp. 12, 28.
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low interest loans. L
In the meantime in the arena of cooperation the E.C.A. pushed quite
hard on the subject of eliminating or reducing import quotas to the ulti-
mate end of balancing its dollar accounts and building an expanding economy
in western Europe. A great deal of pressure both officially and "in the
wings" was brought to bear by the United States on the western European
countries on the subject of the desirability of economic cooperation.
2
The first solid blow was struck against import quotas when, on Novem-
ber 2, the O.E.E.C. requested each member country to eliminate, by
December 15, quantitative restrictions on at least 50 percent of its
imports on private account from other member countries. . . . Although
some countries could not meet the liberalization ratios in full, the
partial abolition of import quotas was one cause of a new upswing in
intra- European trade.
3
The shaky currency situation in many countries was approached head-
on with the formation of the European Payments Union (E.P.U.) to serve the
function of a clearing house for multilateral payments, thereby rendering
unnecessary the machinery of bilateral accounting between any two countries,
A second function of the E.P.U. was that of providing a temporary "cushion"
for debtors thereby allowing short- time imbalances to rectify themselves.
After considerable debate in the spring of 1950, the E.P.U. was formally
launched on July 7, 1950.
Before leaving fiscal year 1950, one final demonstration of coop-
eration must be pointed out. Making this proposal particularly significant
is the fact that it came completely from the Europeans themselves. On May
lAgency for International Development, U.S. Economic Assistance
Programs
, p. 6.








9, 1950, French Minister Robert Schuman proposed the formation of a joint
(French and German) coal and steel production authority which would be open
to other European countries. The United States was delighted by this de-
velopment and gave it its complete support.!
In looking at the end of fiscal year 1950, the student cannot help
but be awed by the tremendous strides which had been made and the striking
progress which had become hard fact. Although the problems were far from
gone, all things taken into consideration, the picture was a strongly op-
timistic one. It was completely out of the blue that the events of June 25,
1950--just five days before the celebrated "mid-point"--came to change the
entire European Recovery Program so dramatically. In a move which caught
the free countries of the world completely off guard, the Communists struck
in Korea with both speed and strength and their ploy came dangerously close
to succeeding.
1950 - 1951 (FY'51)
Sunday, June 25. The next morning at the State Department the news
was bad. A full scale attack centering around a tank column was driv-
ing toward Seoul and Kimpo airport. South Korean arms were clearly
outclassed. *•
It had taken but a few painful days to remind the United States and
the nations of western Europe that war had not vanished from the face of
the world--it had been only dormant, and now again was a harsh reality.
"General Joseph L. Collins /Chief of Staff, U.S. Army/ pressed for and ob-
tained the president's authority to have General MacArthur send a survey
iDean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W. W. Norton






team to Korea to make a first hand appraisal and report." 1 The report only
served to confirm the shocking truth and President Truman immediately au-
thorized our troops to go into combat. "We were then fully committed in
2
Korea."
In looking back, the United States and western Europe had been
working so desperately hard on making the European Recovery Program a vi-
able effort, that perhaps they had lost track of the hard facts of life.
Our purpose had been so noble, the response so strong and the progress so
impressive that we had been as a man with blinders: unaware of the world's
pragmatic dimensions.
The impact on the Marshall Plan could have easily been foreseen.
Whereas prior to the outbreak of Korean hostilities not one penny of United
States assistance had been spent on defense-related items, after our com-
mitment to assist the South Koreans was made, almost every dollar of the
assistance funds was spent in building up the military power of the western
European countries with the intent of detering any further Communist ag-
gression.
The impact was felt not only in the area of program emphasis but
in organization as well. "Responsibility for broad coordination of all
foreign aid programs—military, economic, and technical--was given to an
International Security Affairs Committee under the Secretary of State. . . "-'
This committee included representatives from the Departments of State, De-
fense, and Treasury, the E.C.A. and the Executive Office of the President.












economic recovery had already been secured. Taking the year of 1950 as a
whole and considering both industrial and agricultural production, the com-
parative figure of 114 could be assigned (relative to the index figure of
1938:100). 1 Perhaps even more significant is the fact that by the end of
calendar year 1950, industrial yield (aggregated for all countries) was at
a level almost 25 per cent above the 1938 level. Increases in agricultural
production while somewhat less dramatic were nonetheless impressive.
*
Yet another good sign was that industrial and agricultural gains
had been accompanied by a strong rise in trade. By June 30, 1950, imports
were at a level twice that of 1938 and perhaps even more significant, ex-
ports to the United States and Canada had approximately tripled over their
1938 levels.
The original agreement among O.E.E.C. members to free a certain
percentage of their goods from import restrictions, was increased to 75
percent by February 1, 1951. Fiscal year 1951 also marked the first year
of operation for the already-mentioned European Payments Union. The E.P.U.
provided a mechanism of multilateral payments for the member countries and
played a significant role in not only fostering intra-European trade but
in assisting from a technical point of view in the ''banking" aspects of
such trade.
The Coal and Steel Community proposal of French Foreign Minister
Schuman had been warmly and enthusiastically received by the United States
and led to the ultimate union of six European countries (France, Germany,
^Organization of European Economic Cooperation, Ninth Report
, pp.
168, 170.
^It must be pointed out that inasmuch as population had grown by
approximately 10 percent over 1938, the aggregate industrial and agricul-
tural figure of 114 was just slightly higher than the 1938 statistic.
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Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy) and the agreement: "...
that all tariffs, quantitative restrictions, discriminatory taxes or freight
rates, and other barriers to a single market in coal and steel between the
six countries should be abolished. . . ."*•
All of the foregoing were the positive factors against which the
impact of the Korean War would be weighed. It is of critical significance
that the recovery program had made such fine strides because our preoccu-
pation with Korea, which was made manifest in the change of the flow of re-
sources which went to western Europe, might otherwise have left Europe in
a highly vulnerable economic position.
This 12-month period: ". . . was particularly notable for tasks
that distracted us from the main construction work of rebuilding. . . .'
In all objectivity, both sides of the picture must be painted. Serious
problems still existed: coal which had been singled out from the beginning
as a key commodity continued to play its role as the Achilles' Heel of eco-
nomic recovery. Raw materials in general became increasingly scarce as the
fiscal year wore on--primarily because of war demands. The countries of
western Europe at the urging of the United States began to look to their
overseas territories in terms of being potential sources of all matter of
raw materials.
The problem of inflation, too, must be mentioned. The O.E.E.C.
went so far as to say that: "... Inflationary pressures . . . threatened
to interrupt the economic development of Europe, endangered the progress
already achieved and rendered more difficult the accomplishment of the
1Price, The Marshall Plan
, p. 146.





defense effort from vhich they had sprung." 1
The "liabilities" side of our balance sheet for the year in ques-
tion would therfore reflect raw material shortages, inflation, and political
uncertainty (brought about by the military action of June 25, 1950 with its
attendant ramifications). On the "assets" side, would have to be mentioned
an aggregate index of industrial and agricultural production of 114 and
economic cooperation. In the balance as the fourth and final year of the
Marshall Plan began, the atmosphere could best be described as "guardedly
optimistic."
1951 - 1952 (FY'52)
By July 1st of 1951, the hot war was still blazing but the "cold
war" was soon to become a reality. It finally dawned on the peoples of the
free world that:
The Soviet Union has been and is carrying on a completely new kind of
war. . . . For the Kremlin, the military is only one of four fronts-
each a battleground of implacable attack. These four fronts are the
military, economic, political and psychological.
2
Reflecting the unavoidable trend from "economic recovery" to "mutu-
al security" was the renaming on November 1, 1951 of the Economic Coopera-
tion Administration to the Mutual Security Agency. * The legislation placed
the Director of the "new" Mutual Security Agency within the Executive Office
^Organization for European Economic Cooperation, Economic Progress
and Problems (Paris: O.E.E.C., 1951), p. 19.
2Paul G. Hoffman, Peace Can be Won (New York: Doubleday, 1951),
pp. 16, 18.
3The title of Mutual Security Agency was to be relatively short-
lived: on August 1, 1953 the administering agency for economic assistance
became the Foreign Operations Administration and Less than two years later
on July 1, 1955 it became The International Cooperation Administration.
This format lasted a little over six years until November 4, 1961 when the
present Agency for International Development was "created."
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of the President and the M.S. A. job became one of coordinating and super-
vising all foreign assistance programs.
Although the emphasis came to be placed on defense-related projects,
the purely economic items did not completely vanish. The previous year
(fiscal year 1951) had seen $2,622 billion in economic aid, not to mention
a large dollar commitment to mutual security (in addition to the $2,622
billion). Fiscal year 1952 saw the economic portion in the last year of
the Marshall Plan, dwindle to $1,985 billion dollars.
In trying to recapture the attitudes and sentiments among those who
were aboard when the transition was made from E.C.A. to M.S. A., I spoke to
Mr. Valerio Montanari who is still with A.I.D. He felt that two primary
factors combined to lower enthusiasm at that juncture. The first was the
fact that three-plus years had elapsed since those first hectic and mission-
oriented days. In other words, as procedures became standardized and as
the goals approached fulfillment, enthusiasm necessarily began to dwindle--
the sheer passage of time whittled away at the esprit de corps which had
been so obviously present at the onset. The second factor had to do with
the change in thrust from economic to military objectives. Among the more
altruistic members of the E.C.A. , many who had been motivated by what Mr.
Montanari calls an almost "missionary" spirit of dedication, did not feel
comparably moved by defense-oriented and quasi-military programs. These
two factors combined to set the stage for a new period in our foreign as-
sistance efforts, a period which would never quite be able to recapture
the zeal of the early years.
From the European point of view, many of the efforts of the O.E.E.C.
in the last year of the Marshall Plan were aimed at consolidating the




progress made in the preceding three years. Having successfully
"stretched," the Europeans now sought to "structure" their gains. *•
J-The concept of "stretching and structuring" is borrowed from Pro-





The enormity of the task before all of them _/the western European coun-
tries/ after the war in Europe . . . only slowly revealed itself. As
it did so, it began to appear as just a bit less formidable than that
described in the first Chapter of Genesis. That was to create a world
out of chaos; ours, to create half a world, a free half, out of the
same material without blowing the whole to pieces in the process. The
wonder of it is how much was done.*-
In examining the Marshall Plan thus far, we have looked at many of
its facets. By looking at the individual pieces we have not assessed the
program as a whole, not placed it, perhaps, in its proper perspective. In
this chapter, an attempt will be made to analyze specifically what was, in
fact, accomplished by the Marshall Plan.
Multiple Motives
Before examining in some detail the substantive achievements of the
Marshall Plan—the end results of the program—it would be well to spend a
moment on the subject of the motives which underlay the European Recovery
Program.
To millions impoverished by World War II it meant food, tools, a chance
to work, a source of new hope. Worried leaders in western Europe saw
in it an assurance of help on a scale that might enable them to cope






with their most urgent recovery problems. ... To some Europeans--a
growing number as the recovery program developed—another fundamental
issue was involved. . . . The Marshall Plan emphasized European initi-
ative in developing a collective appraisal of economic problems and
collective proposals for dealing with them. This suggested—vaguely
at first--a joint approach which could be the harbinger of a new soli-
darity within western Europe.
1
It is hardly surprising that the Marshall Plan became so many
things to so many people, because it had been born out of an amalgam of
motives and objectives. On the one hand, and particularly in the first
15 months of its existence, the emergency relief nature of the program
seemed to be its raison d'etre . One could summarize the underlying motives
of this period as being social .
As time progressed and as the earlier social goals were for the
most part achieved, the thrust of the program and the corresponding nature
of the assistance shifted to the goal of economic growth. We were inter-
ested, it seems, in a partner on whose financial well-being our own in
large measure depended: "... there can never be any stability or secu-
rity in the world until _/the countries of western Europe/ are able to pay
in commodities and services for what they need to import."^ Since "char-
ity" (usually characteristic of an emergency relief program) more often
than not tends to increase dependency and despair, our goal became one of
helping the participating countries to attain economic self-reliance and
independence. In short, our motives became economic
.
As economic cooperation began to take bold, new forms, the "har-
binger of a new solidarity" came to the forefront. It must have been fore-
most in the minds of those in positions of authority "in the E.C.A. and the
1-Price, The Marshall Plan
, pp. 4-5.
^Dean Acheson, Requirements of Reconstruction
,
Department of State




Department of State and in the Executive Office of the President, that if
European economic cooperation could take permanent enough and significant
enough forms, peace among the countries in question would almost necessar-
ily become a by-product of such union. Our motives, therefore, in fos-
tering such a Utopia were of a political nature.
After the events of June 25, 1950, had awakened the free world to
the harsh reality of a not- so-cold war, our program emphasis shifted to
mutual security and the nature of the assistance to defense-related items.
By the fall of the following year even the name of the administrative agen-
cy had been transformed to reflect the change in thrust. With the estab-
lishment of the Mutual Security Agency came acceptance of the fact that,
like it or not, we could not close our eyes to the military posture of the
enemy. As absolutely essential as was the recovery of the European econ-
omy, any such recovery would nonetheless have to take place not only mind-
ful of the military threat which lay just across the Iron Curtain, but
indeed, willing to pay the price to maintain an adequate counterforce to
such a threat. Our motive in changing the basic thrust of the recovery
effort was military- oriented.
We have thus seen at one point or another social, economic, polit-
ical and military motives all present in the Marshall Plan. But as if
this were not complicated enough mixture, one must add the dimension of
altruism. As concerns this particular subject, the perspective of time
would seem to give weight to Secretary of State George C. Marshall's opin-
ion that:
As regards European recovery, the enlightened self-interest of the
United States coincides with the best interest of Europe itself and of




all those who desire to see conflicts of whatever nature resolved so
that the world can devote its full attention and energy to the progres-
sive improvement of the well-being of mankind.
1
The following thoughts of then-Under Secretary of State Dean
Acheson mirror Marshall's sentiments:
The basic, underlying, never- varying tradition of this republic is in-
sistence upon liberty of the individual, the worth of the individual,
the ultimate test of truth by reference to the individual. . . . This
country has always responded to peoples struggling to attain or main-
tain their freedom. We have done so because it is important to us that
they shall succeed.
2
There were those who read into the Marshall Plan a particularly
high element of self-interest and of "selfishness." Then there were those
who considered the Marshall Plan a noble social invention by which man rose
above self-interest to share economic prosperity with his fellow man.
While it is accurate to state that the latter sentiment enjoyed greater
support than the former, still and all: "Foreign aid remains a noble aim
and a dirty word. "3 It is generally conceded (even by those who consider
"foreign aid" a dirty word) that the Marshall Plan was a broad and cooper-
ative effort, unequalled in its magnitude and nobility of purpose.^ The
winning of the war was no small accomplishment to say the least, but it
was felt by many that: "To the responsibilities and needs of that time
/postwar/ the nation summoned an imaginative effort unique in history and




2Dean Acheson, American Traditions in Today's Foreign Policy , De
partment of State Bulletin XVI, No. 416 (Washington, D.G.: Government
Printing Office, 1947), pp. 1221, 1224.
-'Acheson, Present at the Creation
, p. 729.
^T have paraphrased here the rhetoric used by John F. Kennedy to




even greater than that made in the preceding period of fighting."
That this "imaginative and unique effort" should have been fueled
by varying motives in no way detracted from the fact that it was tremen-
dously successful. Suffice it to say that the humanistic and altruistic
aspects of the Marshall Plan were noble indeed; the economic and financial
facets were more pragmatic; the political "enlightened self-interest fac-
tor was necessary; and the military element exigent.
Aggregate Accomplishments
We are now at the juncture where it is logical to study the more
tangible accomplishments to determine the degree to which the Marshall Plan
contributed to the economic recovery of western Europe. First, the accom-
plishments in production (industrial and agricultural) will be examined,
after which the subject of European economic cooperation and integration
will be treated.
In 1947, the industrial output of western Europe, with seventeen mil-
lion more people than before the war, was 15 to 20 percent less than
in 1938, agricultural production 20 to 25 percent less. Trade was at
a low ebb, dollar reserves had dwindled to the danger point, living
standards in many countries were precarious, and the situation was de-
teriorating. 2
Against this picture of gloom can be analyzed the statistics to be
found on the following page. By the end of the Marshall Plan period (June
30, 1952) steel production was at an index^ of 133 versus 81 (in early
1948 at the onset of the European Recovery Program); merchant shipbuilding
was at 136 versus 75; cement production was at 157 versus 73; motor vehicles
lAcheson, Present at the Creation
, p. 725.
2Price, The Marshall Plan
, p. 223.
^Aggregate industrial and agricultural production statistics for
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Source: Organization for European Economic Cooperation, Ninth Re-
port of the O.E.E.C. (Paris: O.E.E.C., 1958) pp. 169-170.
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were at 18L versus 77; and even such slow to recover commodities as beef
production had surfaced at 102 versus 71. Only coal remained at just under
the pre-war levels of production at 96 versus a post-war 83. ^ Overall, in-
dustrial production soared over 40 percent (from 94 to 134) and agricultur-
al production climbed some 35 percent (from 83 to 112). In short, the re-
cord speaks for itself: tremendous strides were made in a short period
and the role of the Marshall Plan was a decisive one in this recovery.
In terms of the total dollar assistance which was committed during
the 51-month period, the data (in millions of dollars) may be summarized
as follows:
TABLE 3
TOTAL DOLLAR ASSISTANCE COMMITTED
TO THE MARSHALL PLAN
(net obligations and loan authorizations--






















Source: Agency for International Development-, U.S. Economic
Assistance Programs
, p. 6.
ICoal was not to break through the 100 barrier until 1953.
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While industrial production increased during the period of the
Marshall Plan to a significant index figure of 134, the fact is that the
potential for higher output was even greater. In 1951, the American work-
er was producing between two and five times as much per day as his European
counterpart. 1 The setting was ripe for a technical assistance program.
Mr. Paul G. Hoffman describes how the seeds for such a program were first
sewn as a result of his conversation with Sir Stafford Cripps, the Chancel-
lor of the Exchequer:
"If we are to raise the standard of living in Britain," he _/Cripp_s/
said, "we must have greater productivity." My heart quickened; this
was the kind of talk I wanted to hear from a European. Then he contin-
ued. "Great Britain has much to learn about that from the United States
and" --he paused-- "I think we have a few manufacturing secrets we've
been concealing for a generation or so that you might like to learn.
Why don't we interchange this information?" Naturally, I jumped at the
idea. "Let's set up a system of transatlantic visits," I replied. "We
can take British management and labor on tours of American factories
and send Americans to Britain for a look at your shops." Sir Stafford
made the deal right there.
This was truly significant because a straight infusion of fuel,
machines or materials could increase production, but only a sharing of in-
dustrial (and agricultural) secrets of simplification, standardization and
specialization could bring about gains in productivity. That our assist-
ance program should encompass such a sharing of "trade secrets" speaks well
of its nobility of purpose. The Marshall Plan went on to provide manage-
ment training which was both production-oriented and human-behavior-orient-
ed. The best available records indicate that a total of 8,339 Europeans
came to the United States to participate in some form of such training
during the Marshall Plan years.
1-Price, The Marshall Plan
, p. 328.
2THoffman, Peace Can be Won
, pp. 101-102
Agency for Internationa
ton, D.C.: A.I.D., 1971), p. 66
l Development, Operations Report (Washing-

73
The point to be made is this: the United States, through the
Marshall Plan not only helped to increase industrial production to a point
34 percent above pre-war levels* but of equal importance, laid the ground-
work for increased productivity. The approach was that of a two-barrel
shotgun: productivity as well as production; efficiency as well as effec-
tiveness. The countries, it should be pointed out, were particularly ripe
for the implementation of concepts of productivity. The war had served to
"wipe the slate clean" and had cleared the air (for the most part) of the
old way of doing things. Out of the rubble had risen the phoenix of new
ideas and fresh concepts.
Key Country Analysis
Before moving on the subject of European economic cooperation and
integration, the strides made in several of the countries should be ana-
lyzed. Only the major recipients of Marshall Plan resources will be ex-
amined, because it was these handful of countries which bore the brunt of
the war's punishment and were most in need of economic assistance.
United Kingdom
At the top of the list was Great Britain. Although never faced
with the horror of a land war on her own soil, the United Kingdom had none-
theless suffered heavy industrial damage by bombing. The country had also
come out of the war with severe losses in foreign assets and reserves.
Reconstruction was tackled with characteristic determination. . . . The
British accepted an austerity regime which curtailed consumption of
many items. Of the increase in real resources which became available
from 1948 to 1950, only about one-quarter was allowed to go into
iThe increase in production represented a 34 percent rise above




consumption; half went into exports, and the remaining quarter was de-
voted to capital formation. *
The strong emphasis on capital formation made the Marshall Plan an invest-
ment program in the United Kingdom.
The following quotation defines the range and depth of our assis-
tance effort in Great Britain:
These supplies /received under the Marshall Plan/ have provided a gen-
eral support to the whole U.K. economy, and without them it would have
impossible to achieve the steady expansion of industrial production
which took place ... or to sustain so large a programme of capital
investment. . . . There is not a single industry or district in the
country which has not benefited in some way from American aid.
2
A total of $3,189 billion went to the United Kingdom of which ap-
proximately 12 percent ($384.8 million) was in the form of low-interest
loans. 3 A.I.D. reports reveal that $109 million of the $384.8 million has
been repayed and $106 million in interest has been collected. Only five
of the western European countries have repaid in full the total amounts
loaned to them under the Marshall Plan: France, Germany, Italy, Sweden,
and the Netherlands. 5 For the entire area a total of approximately two-
thirds of the principal has been repaid.
In addition to its traditional ties of a bilateral nature with the
United States, Great Britain had familial ties with the nations of the
LPrice, The Marshall Plan
, p. 283.
^Great Britain, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Economic Survey for 1950 , Command Paper #7915
in a series of reports to the Parliament, p. 9.
^Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and
Grants July 1, 1945- June 30,1970 Special Report Proposed for the House
Foreign Affairs Committee (Washington, D.C.: A I.D. 1971), p. 159.








Commonwealth, the result being that its participation and cooperation in
continental western European affairs were often accused of being less than
wholehearted. In rebuttal, however, it must be stressed that British lead-
ership in the establishment of the O.E.E.C was both strong and inspiring.
In balance, Great Britain made great strides forward as evidenced
by the fact that it stopped receiving Marshall Plan assistance on December
31, 1950--a full 18 months prior to the official end of the program.
France
The second largest recipient of Marshall Plan resources was France.
France received a total of $2,714 billion of which $225.6 million (approx-
imately 8 percent) was in the form of low-interest loans. As already
pointed out, France repaid the full amount of the loan including $51.2 mil-
lion in interest.
Several factors played a major role in France's post-war situation.
On the positive side, a large investment plan, the Monnet Plan, was drafted
and implemented before the Marshall Plan got off the ground. Therefore,
France was already heading, albeit slowly, in the right direction. On the
negative side must be mentioned the element of France's colonial holdings:
the unrest in Tunisia and Morocco as well as the war in Indochina was
costing France a high price in manpower and resources. A second negative
factor was that of Communist efforts to disrupt the economy and set worker
against management. A third negative factor was serious inflation. All
of these elements, some positive and some negative, made the picture a









particularly complex one in France; however:
With American aid^ an upsurge in basic_production, and a determined
response to the _/f inancial instability/ emergency by fiscal authori-
ties, remarkable progress was made. In spite of many difficulties,
pre-war living standards were regained and production levels surpassed.
But France did not achieve economic viability or financial equilibrium
during the Marshall Plan period.
1
In short, France still had a very long way to go. Unlike the
United Kingdom which had stopped receiving aid 18 months before the end of
the program, France could have used an extra year of economic assistance
beyond the 51 months of the Marshall Plan to enable it to attain true vi-
ability.
The United Kingdom and France together absorbed some 45 percent of
all the resources committed to the Marshall Plan. By adding to this short
list the countries of Germany (not originally in the total of the sixteen
participating countries), Italy and the Netherlands we see that these five
2
countries garnished close to 75 percent of Marshall Aid dollars. The
other twelve countries shared the remaining one-fourth of the money.
Italy
Third on the list of those countries which recieved the most re-
sources from the Marshall Plan is Italy, which received $1,509 billion of
which only $95.6 million (some 6 percent) represented loans (which were
fully repaid including $21.1 million in interest). The key problem in
Italy (if indeed one single problem can ever be isolated and given that
1Price, The Marshall Plan
, p. 282.
o
Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and
Grants, pp. 137-161.
3lbid., p. 151.





label) was that of galloping inflation. Here the Marshall Plan was able to
exert a strong positive influence. Price quotes Mr. Conato Menichella,
governor of the Bank of Italy, in an interview as saying:
Stabilization was made possible by interim aid. The Communists and
associated parties were strong. Interim aid and the prospects of the
Marshall Plan made it possible to maintain stability in prices and,
therefore, confidence in the lira. These conditions helped to produce
the heaviest defeat of the Communists after the war.l
Germany
Fourth on the list of countries to receive the most aid from the
European Recovery Program is West Germany. West Germany, or more formally
the Federal Republic of Germany, received $1,391 billion of which a little
more than 15 percent ($216.9 million) was in loans. Germany, like France
and Italy already cited, repaid its entire loan amount including $77.6 mil-
lion in interest. That Germany emerged from the war completely devastated
is hard fact. Further aggravating the situation was the dropping of the
Iron Curtain, which in addition to causing psychological and sociological
problems, resulted in a cutting off from western Germany of large areas of
sources for food and raw materials. Yet another element was the fact that
some ten million refugees from the east flooded into the country, making
already limited food and employment that much more scarce.
If one single item can be singled out as marking the watershed
from emergency relief to a true recovery and growth effort in Germany, it
would have to be the currency reform of June 20, 1948. The reform, which
lprice
» The Marshall Plan , p. 275.
^Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and
Grants, p. 146.





was implemented by the U.S. military government, helped to restore stabil-
ity, fostered growth in production and in general paved the way for the
workings of the Marshall Plan. During the Marshall Plan years Germany
greatly reduced its dollar deficit, strengthened its trading position and
made phenomenal strides in production output over the post-war level. The
notion that in aiding Germany we were helping the enemy" was a sentiment
which, although present in some circles, certainly never gained widespread
support among our citizenry, in the press, nor certainly within the E.C.A.
The Netherlands
The Netherlands received $982.1 million of which 15 percent ($149.5
2
million) represented loans. The Netherlands joined France, Italy and
Germany in paying back its loan including $46.5 in interest. Of the "big
five" recipients only Great Britain, to this day, has yet to pay back the
principal of its loan. Price feels that: "The Dutch were among the first
to see the need for greater unity in Europe after the war and the signifi-
cance of Germany in any new western European system."^ This philosophy
was to permeate the entire spirit with which the Marshall Plan was received
and certainly made possible the tremendous strides forward which the Dutch
realized. Levels of production soared, full employment came to be a matter
of national pride and the level of investment in relation to the Dutch GNP
rose to become one of the highest in Europe.
^-Interview, Mr. Valerio Montanari (A.I.D.), Washington, D.C.,
August 24, 1971.
^Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and
Grants, p. 152.
^Agency for International Development, Operations Report
, p. 21.




The five countries just cited (Great Britain, France, Italy,
Germany and the Netherlands) accounted for approximately 75 percent of all
assistance rendered under the Marshall Plan and thereby constitutes a handy
cutting-off point. To complete the picture in summary form, a listing of
all countries and the amount (grants plus loans) received, follows: *
Country Amount



















It is now time to look at a highly significant subject: that of
the relation between the Marshall Plan and European economic cooperation
and integration.
Sixteen European countries came to Paris and then drew up—which had
never been attempted before, let alone done—an amalgamated balance of
payments accounts of their trade with one another, with the American
^-Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and
Grants
, pp. 14, 26, 137-161.
o
This amount does not agree with the figure of $14.5 billion cited
earlier in this chapter because included in the larger amount are other
assistance funds granted during the Marshall Plan period to such non-area
countries as China, India, Israel, etc.
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continent, and with the rest of the world. This statement made clear





The strides taken in Paris in just a matter of weeks and months had
surpassed centuries of similar attempts. The cornerstone was laid when
the: "Member countries formally . . . bound themselves to cooperate close-
ly in their economic relations with one another. "^ It was as if, after a
long sleep, the nations in question had finally awakened to the fact their
economic systems were inter-related and that the prosperity of each depend-
ed in large measure on the prosperity of all of them.
In a book written in the early days of the Marshall Plan, the
French writer Henry Peyret enjoined Europe to grasp the marvelous opportu-
nity for cooperation provided by the Marshall Plan: "Le plan Marshall pro-
pose a 1' Europe craer un espace economique plus large dans un climat de
liberte afin de franchir une etape nouvelle do progres. ... To reject
the opportunity was, according to Peyret, to run the risk of falling into
the quagmire of anarchy and impotence.
The role of cooperation was quickly given its acid test when the
United States government, through the E.C.A., told the O.E.E.C. to decide
for itself how the resources for the first full year were to be divided.
It finally dawned on the countries in question that cooperation was in
their own best interest.
The degree of cooperation which was achieved was so striking that
Priced concluded that: "From a long-range viewpoint, what was accomplished
*-A„D. Marris, Prospects for Closer European Economic Integration
(London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948), p. 8.
^Organization for European Economic Cooperation, European Economic
Cooperation (Paris: O.E.E.C, 1948), p. 7.
^Henry Peyret, Le Plan Marshall; Peut-il Sauver 1' Europe? (Paris:
Societe d'Editions Francaises et Internationales, 1948), p. 222.
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through the Marshall Plan was not so much the final solution of transient
problems, as a series of national and international efforts . . . toward
the solution of continuing problems. "1
The shape which the cooperation and integration took during the
51-months of the Marshall Plan was a number of economic vehicles the most
significant of which are listed below:
April 16, 1948 - Establishment of the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.)
September 19, 1950 - Signature of the Agreement establishing the
European Payments Union (E.P.U.)
April 18, 1951 - Treaty signed by Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands estab-
lishing the European Coal and Steel Community.
March 24, 1952 - European Production Agency created
Perhaps the most significant of the economic arrangements to have
crystalized subsequent to June 30, 1952, is the European Economic Community
(the Common Market) which was set into motion by a treaty signed on March
25, 1957.
Progress toward cooperation and integration was also made in the
areas of military and political activity. Signal among the agreements must
surely be mentioned the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
ization in 1949 and the creation of the Council of Europe in that same year,
It is well beyond the scope of this thesis to dwell on either; they do,
however, represent tangible evidence of the spirit of cooperation which was
created in post-war western Europe. The O.E.E.C. had been the "Grandaddy"
of them all in those post-war years:
The O.E.E.C. stood out as the first organization through which the dis-
integration of western Europe into autarkic islands had been checked
and a reverse trend established. During the transition both immediate





economic necessity and temporary American aid were important contribu-
ting factors. With advancing recovery these factors receded in impor-
tance. That the trend did not then collapse seems to have been due
chiefly to the successful demonstration given by the O.E.E.C. and other
emergent European institutions that positive benefits of distinct val-
ue to all members could be achieved by closer economic cooperation.
Cooperation had in fact taken forms which would have been thought
impossible a few short years before.
Overview
We have seen that industrial production climbed to an index figure
of 134 from a 1948 low of approximately 94. ^ Agricultural production dur-
ing the Marshall Plan period climbed to an index figure of 112 from its
post-war low of 83--a jump of some 35 percent.
At the same time that production was climbing 45 percent in indus-
trial items and 35 percent in agricultural commodities, increases in pro-
ductivity were begun, paving the way for true economic viability.
The seeds of cooperation and integration had not only been planted
but had given their first fruits. All tangible evidence pointed to the
fact that closer cooperation would become the modus operandi of the future.
In short, the strides made in practically all of the participating
countries during the period of the Marshall Plan exceeded the most optimis-
tic estimates made at the onset.
The summary and conclusion will attempt to tie together "assistance










To briefly review the situation as it was in the early days of
1948, Paul Hoffman, first Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Admin-
istration, reminds us that:
The year 1948 was a fateful one for western Europe, menaced by Kremlin
conspiracies. No less an authority than British Foreign Secretary
Ernest Bevin has said that western Europe was on the verge of collapse,
And some well-informed correspondents were predicting throughout the
spring of that year that within a matter of months--possibly weeks-
western Europe would be dominated by Soviet Russia. There was ample
ground for this pessimism. . . . Broken factories were operating fit-
fully and often slowed to a halt for lack of raw materials and repair
parts for equipment. Farmers raised little more than enough to feed
themselves. The transport system was in too sad a state of disrepair
to carry even the slight food surpluses to undernourished city dwell-
ers. ... To compound all these troubles, western Europe found itself
host to millions of refugees and displaced persons who had fled the
Kremlin's terror in eastern Europe.
1
In Extremis
There is, among the nautical terminology used at sea today a term
called in extremis
,
meaning literally "at the point of death." On the open
sea _in extremis describes a set of circumstances in which, no matter what
action is taken, a collision will inexorably result. It represents the





"too late to do anything" situation. All of the evidence both written and
in interviews that I came across in researching my thesis points to the
fact that western Europe was about to unintentionally place itself JLn ex-
tremis . The foregoing quote from Mr. Hoffman's book talks in terms of "a
matter of months—possibly weeks" before western Europe might find itself
at the end of the line.
The previously drawn analogy of the seriously injured body steadily
lapsing into death bears repeating. It will be recalled that Secretary of
State George C. Marshall, in reporting to the American people upon his re-
turn from the Moscow Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers h?d warned
that: "The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate."! A similar
analogy was later used by the member countries of the O.E.E.C. when, in
their Third Report, they stated that: "Marshall Aid was the blood trans-
fusion which sustained the weakening European economies and gave them the
strength to work their own recovery. "2
All available data generally paints the same picture: the almost
in extremis situation, the patient about to go under.
Primary Question
While written documents point to an extremely grave situation,
they never come right out and ask (let alone definitively answer): would
western Europe have "gone under" if the United States had not, when it did,
implemented the Marshall Plan? Typical of the treatment given this
lMarshall, Moscow address, p. 17.
^Organization for European Economic Cooperation, Third Report,
Economic Progress and Problems, p. 10.
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particular subject is the following "qualified" quotation from Price:
Did the European Recovery Program . . . actually stave off a collapse
of western and southern Europe? Were economic and political conditions
so threatening that without such a program the continent would have
been exposed, country by country, to the fate of the satellites to the
east? The answer to these questions, by many competent observers, is
yes. 1
And a few pages later: "It /the Marshall Plan/ probably forestall-
ed a collapse of western Europe and the Mediterranean area and their un-
willing incorporation into the orbit of world communism. "2 (Italics mine).
The gentlemen interviewed, however, were quite eager to discuss
this particular point, full well realizing that to give an unqualified
"yes" (or "no") would be to create (or deny) a cause and effect relation-
ship between assistance and recovery. The conclusions reached were signif-
icant to say the least because to a man the gentlemen interviewed felt that
without a doubt, there would have been economic and political chaos in
western Europe if the Marshall Plan had not been implemented. Bluntly put,
western Europe would have followed in the footsteps of eastern Europe end-
ing up behind the Iron Curtain. In all fairness, however, it must be ad-
mitted that while some of the gentlemen interviewed felt that all of west-
ern Europe would have fallen, others felt that some countries might have
escaped the impending doom. More specifically, Great Britain was mentioned
most often as being that country which might mot have fallen prey to Com-
munist domination. Italy, France, and Germany, on the other hand, were the
most frequently mentioned countries which interviewees felt would have been
among the "first to go." It is of the utmost significance that men who
were intimately familiar with the situation in those post-war years should





so unanimously feel that the Marshall Plan had played such a decisive and
central role.
To the more tangible resources of dollars and materials would have
to be added yet another contribution of the Marshall Plan. By sharing its
industrial and agricultural expertise with the western Europeans, the
United States demonstrated rather dramatically its willingness to give not
only its dollars but its knowledge. As a result of the application of the
expertise, there resulted increased productivity and while the concept of
productivity was certainly not new, it nonetheless drove home the point
very vividly that in it lay the key to a higher standard of living. By
focusing on greater output per man day it was not long before the concepts
of wider markets, greater diversification and tighter competition had taken
root. These in turn became the adrenalin which spurred the patient to re-
covery.
One is forced to conclude that the Marshall Plan took the shape of
not only dollars, materials and technical assistance but, of even greater
importance, the Marshall Plan embodied the spirit of partnership; it in-
corporated fellowship as well as assistance. The idea that we would see
this problem through together had been paramount from the very onset when
Secretary Marshall in his now-famous Harvard address on June 5, 1947, had
stated: "The program should be a joint one." 1 In point of fact, the con-
cept of two continents jointly sharing this awesome burden was a very pow-
erful and moving one, prompting Price to note that:
The impact of the Marshall Plan, even before the first aid shipment
started, was notable. A wave of new hope swept across western Europe.
Despite veiled threats and a barrage of Communist propaganda against





the United States and the recovery program, the cooperating nations
attacked with renewed vigor the task of recovery.!
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in retrospect, was able to say
about the Marshall Plan:
The balance_sheet of__our relations with "the vast external realm" for
this time _/1945-1953/ is well in the black. Our efforts for the most
part left conditions better than we found them. This was plainly true
in western Europe. At the beginning of the period that half continent,
shattered by its years of civil war, was disintegrating politically,
economically, socially and psychologically. . . . Eight years later the
economic life of western Europe had largely recovered its pre-war vigor
and was moving on to new heights of productivity undreamed of before.
Brilliant leaders had inspired their peoples with a new will and new
vision of a political, social and economic integration so that the eco-
nomic help and military security we offered was used with full invig-
orating effect.
2
Put more quantitatively by the participating nations themselves:
Achievements substantially exceeded the targets in almost all fields,
total industrial production rising 65 .percent above the 1947 levels
against the 40 percent hoped for. With steel production well above
expectations, production of machinery expanded roughly twice as much
as had been foreseen, opening the way for new increases of ouput. The
success achieved in expanding electricity capacity enabled the greatly
enhanced requirements to be met. Coal production, however, did not
grow as much as had been expected. Agriculture exceeded the target of
a 38 percent increase on the 1947 level, permitting an increase in con-
sumption at the same time as reduced imports.
3
The advances made were striking. The Marshall Plan had made pos-
sible what Dean Acheson calls: ". . . the dawn of a revivification un-
paralleled in modern history."^ Paul Hoffman was moved to say: 'This
comeback has been called 'the most courageous in history', and I support
that verdict." 5
lPrice, The Marshall Plan
,
p. 396.
^Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 728.
^Organization for European Cooperation, Ninth Report
,
p. 30.
^Acheson, Present at the Creation
,
p. 257.
^Hoffman, Peace Can Be Won, p. 90.
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In an attempt at looking objectively at both sides of the picture,
criticisms of the Marshall Plan were sought. These proved to be extremely
difficult to find. Even among those persons who considered foreign aid "a
noble aim and a dirty word,"l there were apparently few willing to cast
the first stone against the Marshall Plan. 2 In the balance, one would be
forced to conclude that while a small percentage of the population may have
felt that the Marshall Plan was a "give away" program of the most generous
variety, the overwhelming majority believed that it was both realistic in
scope and necessary in purpose. This does not mean, however, that the me-
chanics of the assistance effort did not come under fire. Indeed, Paul
Hoffman himself, for example, felt that the legislation requiring that at
least 50 percent of all U.S. -financed goods destined for western Europe be
transported in U.S. "bottoms" should be repealed immediately.
3
Conclusion
In conclusion, it can be unequivocally said of the Marshall Plan
that it:
. . . afforded without stint the critical margin of resources and en-
ergy needed to make possible an amazingly rapid recuperation of the
European economy. ... It demonstrated, in unprecedented fashion, the
possibility of organizing and carrying out vast international endeav-
ors—not for destruction, but for construction and peace. Belying in
performance the charge of imperialism, it gave the United States a new
stature in the world as a leader to be trusted. And it set in train a
succession of promising developments.
4
After examining the available evidence, I feel that the Marshall
1971.
^Acheson, Present at the Creation
,
p. 729.
^Interview, Valerio Montanari (A.I.D.) Washington, D.C., August 24,
^Hoffman, Peace Can Be Won
,
p. 59.





Plan did prevent the collapse of western Europe. The Marshall Plan was in-
strumental in renewing economic vitality, it planted the seed of productiv-
ity and nurtured it through its formative years, and it fostered vehicles
of economic cooperation and integration which live and prosper to this day.
But perhaps even greater than these factors, significant as they admittedly
are, was the paramount fact that the Marshall Plan brought hope and confi-
dence to a shattered continent. In a letter to the author Mr. Hoffman
stated:
. . . the Europeans would have had a very tough job saving Europe if
it had not been for the help extended by the Marshall Plan. They were
in desperate need of materials and machines which we supplied, but the
ingredient most needed was hope. Overlooked in most of the history of
the Marshall Plan was the fact that a despairing people became a hope-
ful people as a result of the help extended by the Marshall Plan.l
Senator Vandenberg captured this underlying and all- important sen-
timent of reassurance so well when he said:
We are enjoined together in a crusade for enduring peace. We grip
friendly hands across the sea. We have no enemies unless aggressors
nominate themselves as such. Our common cause is human rights, fun-
damental liberties and a free world of free men.
2
Secretary of State George C. Marshall, by any standards a giant
among public servants, and truly the father of the program which bore his
name, had foreseen and expressed in his Harvard address the key sentiment
which underlay this noble effort: "Our policy is directed not against any
country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. "3,4
^-Paul G. Hoffman, letter to Daniel H. Laurent dated on September 1,
1971.
^Arthur H. Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg
,
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), pp. xxi-xxii.
^George C. Marshall, address cited, p. 4.




The United States of America, through the medium of the Marshall
Plan, had played the decisive, if not the principal, role in the battle
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